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INTRODUCTION 
The problem of evil has been a stumbling block to mankind 
through all the ages and philosophers of all times have tried to 
solve this problem. At oertain periods of history questions like: 
ItWhenoe is evil?" or: "11' there is a oreator-God, how oan He 
permit so much evil and oruelty in His world1" have especially 
moved the hearts of men. Without doubt our oentury i3 such a time, 
a oentury of two world wars. In the 2nd world war alone more than 
50 million men, women and ohildren were killed. l Thousands of 
times a day, when their children and beloved ones were torn to 
pieces by bombs and grenades, people oursed God - if indeed there 
was a God at all. Wolfgang Borchert expressed the mentality of a 
Whole genera.tion, when he wrote in 1946: 
"Lieber Gott. Lieber Gott. Aber ich sage nioht Lieber 
Gott, du, ioh kenne keinen, der ein li.ber Gott ist, 
du •••• Wsnn bist du eigentlich lieb, lieber Gott? 
Warst du lieb, ala du meinen Jungen, der gerade ein 
Jabr alt war, ala du meinen kleinen Jungen von einer 
bruellenden Bombe zerreissan 1iesst? Warst d~ da lieb, 
als du ihn ermorden liesst, lieber Gott, ja1" 
IGermany Reports, Published by the Press and Information Offic 
of the Feaaral dovernment, 1961, p. 32. 
2Borohert, Draussen vor der Tuer, Gesamtwerk, p. 181: "Dear 
God,Dear God. But I dont~ay-rDear God--you'; I dontt know any-
one, who is a Dear God •••• Tell me when you are kind, dear God? 
Were you kind, when you permitted my year-old son to be torn in 
pieces by a whirling bomb? Were you kind then,when you permitted 
him to be killed, dear God?" 
1 
2 
In this situation we Christians have the responsibility to 
give an answer to a desparately questioning mankind. The great 
outlines of the answer, which the Church gave through many centu-
ries and still gives today, were systematically elaborated by ':it. 
Augustine. 
For St. Augustine as for the men of our woeful days, the prob 
lem of evil is the deaisive problem of life. Augustine wrestled 
with the solution all his lifetime. It is the purpose of this 
study to point out the basia pr1nciples of his solut1on. Others 
have undertaken sim1lar studies, inaluding Jolivat's excellent 
article ~ Problema ~ !!! d'.pres Saint Augustin. We regard this 
study therefore as a reevaluation of St. Augustine's teaching 
about the problem of evil. 
This thesis will. limit its consideration of the problem of 
evil to st. Augustine's anti-Maniehean works (with a few helpful 
referenaes to other books). We must state at onee that we will no 
find in his anti-Manichean works the total answer to the problem 
of evil which Augustine gave. One could distingu1sh three stages 
in the solution of Augustine to the problem. 
First, 1n the writings immediately after his conversion, as 
in De Ordine and De Musica, evil is primarily seen as priVation of 
- _ .................... 
goodness and the neoessa~ oonsequence of finite natures. As such 
evil is nihil or the tend&lilcy to nothing. This physical evil is 
justified from the point of vie. of the order of the aosmos. The 
great beauty of the un1verse could not exist without corrupting 
3 
lower beings. This solution we call with Jolivet the esthetio 
solution. As tar as it goes, it is oorreot, but it is insufficien 
in a world of sin. Augustine always retains this solution. He 
states it still in one of his lest books, his De Civitate Dei. 
- -
Seoond, reading Holy Soripture,.Augustine became more and mor 
aware of the oentral position whioh free will and sin have in the 
problem of evil. Augustine from then on stresses the tact that 
sin is the only evil. In so ts.r as physioal. evil affliots man, It 
gets it real meaning from tree will and sin. ThIs meaning shows 
it to be a punishment and medioine for moral evil. In the anti-
Maniohean books Augustine maintains the esthetic solution, but 
this moral solution is the dominant one. 
Third, in later years, especially in the fi8ht against the 
Pelagians, Augustine had to go deeper into theological implioation 
of the problem of evil. Thus he had to oonsider the relation bet-
ween graoe and free will and the problem of predestination. Since 
this thesis intends to be a philosophical study, we exolude with 
all the later books these theological questions from our oonside-
ration. 
Augustine subdivides the basic problem into two questions: 
1) What is the nature of evil? 2) What is the origin of evil? 
Philosophers of anoient and modern times have arrived at a variety 
of different answers to this problem. The Manicheans saw them-
selves oompelled to aoknowledge an evil Prinoiple that fights 
against the good Prlnoiple. This fight shows itself In a world, 
4 
where parts of the good Principle are captured by the evil PrinciPE 
This evil Principle then is identified with matter. Edgar S. 
Brightman, a philosopher of our time, did not go thus far but the 
inexplainable aspect of evil forced him to think of God as limited 
in his power by a "Given" in God him~elf. Others like Schopen-
hauer and his followers replaced the oreator-God by a blind power. 
Again others on the opposite extreme tried simply to deny the re-
ality of all evils, explaining them as a purely subjeotive illusion 
These and similar solutions necessarily end in contradiction. 
It is true that Augustine cunnot explain the problem of evil with-
out leaving a residue that is not fully explainable for the human 
mind. Instead ot leading to final co~radiotion, however, his 
solution ends in the mystery of the infinite God. The Augustinian 
solution is satisfactory, sinoe the human mind is willing, or at 
least is able to bow before the mystery of the infinite God. It 
cannot and must not,however,acoept an apparent oontradiction. 
The most basic differenoe between Augustine's solution and 
many of the extreme solutions, is that for Augustine the starting 
point and the touchstone of vll his philosophizing about the prob-
lem of evil is the infiniteness of God. God is the greatest being, 
the highest good; He is Being and Goodness itself. This is an 
unshakeable truth for him. Anyone who does not agree with AugusthE 
on this point will not be able to understand his solution. 
From this theooentric way of thinking follow some characteris-
tic traits in Augustine's solution. These have caused sharp cri-
5 
ticism of his 'handling of the problem of evil. One of these traits 
is the overall importance Augustine attributes to the universal 
order. The universal order is for Augustine an image of the unity 
in God. He measures the good or evil of a single being at the de-
gree and place, how and where it fits into this order. Because of 
this, Scipio) accused Augustine of n;t having solved the problem 
of evil. He sa.ys that Augustine completely overlooked. the indivi-
dual being. It is our concern to show that although Augustine 
stressed the higher order, he did not overlook the interest of the 
individual human being. 
Another consequence of Augustine's theocentric thinking is his 
stress of the negative character of evil. God is being, and since 
evil is the opposite of being, it can only be nihil. Beoause of 
his concept of nihil Augustine has been reproached from different 
sides. Trepte4 contends that Augustine at times uses the nibil 
as • positive principle, substituting it for the evil principle of 
the Manichean8. Windelband5 goes so far as to say that Augustine 
never overcame the Manichean dualism of his earlier days. 
3K • Scipio. Des Aurelius Augustinus Meta~hysik im Rahmen 
seiner Lehre vom Uba!, (Leipzig 1886), p. !o -- . 
4A.Trepte, Die metaphysische Unvollkommunheit der Creatur und 
das moralische Ubel bei Augustinus und IJeibn1z, (Halle 1889), 
pp. 3-6. 
5W.Windalband, A Histo;:z of Philosophl. trans. J. Tufts, 
}th ad. (New York, 1'9'5'), p. 2'8'5. 
6 
A consequence of Augustine's oonoept of evil as nihil is his 
explanation of the aotivity of evil beings in this world. As no-
thing, evil cannot have any effective power. Therefore Aug,lstine 
calls the evil act a Idafect'. Critics like SciPi06 and Trepte7 
have understood this concept as if Augustine denies any pows~' to 
the evil SUbject, to the t natura cOl."rupta'. Against this interpre-
tation we contend that one has to distinguish between the formal 
and the ms.terial aspect of evil in order to understand Augllstine 
in this point. The formal aspect of evil expresses the privation, 
the absence of the good that is due for the perfection of a being. 
As privation then evil cannot be effective. The material aspect, 
on the ot~ler hand, shows the corrupted subject, as deprived partly 
of its goodness. In so far as it exists, this ;3ubject has activitYJ 
but as a corrupted subject its activity is defective. 
This thesis is divided in three main parts. In the first part 
we give a short sarvey of the role which the problem of evil had 
in Augustine's life. In the second part we deal with physicul evilJ 
and in the third, with moral evil. The second and third part are 
each divided into two sections. The first section is concerned 
with the nature of ev11, the second w1th the origin of evil. In 
6saipl0, pp. 107-108 
7Trepte, PP. 30-32 
7 
this divi sion we follow Augustine himself when he tells the fl,4'ani-
cheans that one cannot talk about the origin of evil before one 
knows what evil 18. 8 
CHAPTER I 
THE HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN 
ST. AUGUSTINE'S LIFE. 
This thesis will be concerned with the problem or evil in 
St. Augustinets antl-Manichean books, especially De Moribus Manl-
- -
ohaeorum, Q! Libero Arbitrio, Disputatio contra Fortunatum, Contra 
Epistolam Maniahaei quam Voaant Fundamenti, Contra Faustum !!E±-
ahaeum, ne Natura Bona contra Xanichaaos, and the other minor works 
- -
In the Retraotationes, Augustine himself advises his readers 
to rollow the order of time in which he wrote his books, so that 
they might notioe the progress he was able to make during his life-
time in the understanding of the mysteries of nature and grace. l 
Such a development oan also be found in his treatment of the one 
problem that occupied Augustine during his whole life: the problem 
of evil. 
In the analysis of the rollowing chapters it will be n~cessary 
to neglect the temporal order. Therefore, it seems advisable to 
give first a general surveyor this problem at the different stages 
of Augustine'. theoretiaal development. 
laetraot., prolo,_ 3; PL. 32,586: "Inveniet enim rortasse 
quomodo scrlbendo pro eaerii; quisquis opusoula mea, ordine quo 
scripta, legerit." 
8 
9 
Reading his Confessions one finds that the history of Augus-
tine's oonversion was most int1mately oonneoted w1th the solut1on 
of the problem of ev1l. To his friend Evodius Augustine says that 
in his early youth already he was vexed by this problem but was 
unable to find a solution. 2 
When 19 years old August1ne read Cioerots Hortensius. By this 
book he was stirred up from the immoral life into whioh he had 
sunk at Carthage. 3 A love for truth, the philosophioal evos4 was 
-
awakened in him. A longing for the spiritual world beoame very 
strong in him; but the Hortensius itself, as Augustine says in his 
Confessions, could not satisfy this longing. In vain did Augustine 
look for the name of Christ in it: 
" ••• Quoniam hoo nomen seoundum misericordiam tuam, 
DOmine, hoe nomen salvatoris mei, tilii tui, in ipso 
adhuo laote matris tenerum oor meum pie blberat et alte 
retinebat,et quidquid sine hoo nomine tuisset quamvis 
litteratum et expolitum at veridioum, non me totum ra-
piebat. tt.!:> 
2De Libera Arbitrio, I, 2; PL. 32,1224: "Eam quaestionem moves 
quae me-admodum adolesoentem vehementer ex.rouit, et fat1gatum in 
haeretioos pulit atque dejeoit. Quo casu ita sum afrliotus, et 
tantis obrutus aoervie 1nanium tabularum, ut nisi m1hi amor 1nve-
niend1 veri opem divinam impe~ravisset, emergere inde atque in ip-
sam pr1mam quaerendi libertatem respirare non possem.n 
3contessiones, III,2; PL. 32, 683: "Rapiebant me speotaoula 
theatr1oa, plena imaginibus miseriarum mearum, et fomitibus Ignis 
mei." 
4Conf• III,4; PL. 686'1 n ••• hoo tamen solo deleotabatur in 
illa exhortations, quod no. lllam aut illam seotam, sed ipsam quae-
oumque esset saplentiam ut diligerem, at quaererem et adsaquerar 
at ten.rem atque amplexarer fortiter ••• " 
SConf. 111,4; PL. 686. 
10 
30 Augustine turned to Holy scripture, but he could not yet 
grasp the high wisdom of the Bible and its style was too simple to 
6 fasoinate him. 
At this oritioal moment the Manicheans offered to solve all 
aia troubles. They boasted to give scientific solutions to all 
problems, and Augustine sought truth by means of pure human know-
ledge. All day long the Manioheans had the name of Christ in their 
mouth. This name of Christ was for Augustine a criterion where to 
seek the truth. They had their own method of bib1ioal exegesis 
which seemed very promising to Augustine. Most of all, they offe~ 
a final solution of the problem ot evil, which had become more 
vexing for him since he had been awakened by the Hortensius to 
the search of truth and felt the burden of his sensual life more 
than ever betore. 7 
As to Holy Soripture, the Manicheans taught there to be a 
oontradiction between the Old Testament and the New Testament. 
They oontended that many parts of the New Testament were falsified 
by the Christians. Th1s treatment of the Bible appealed very muoh 
to August1ne, for at that time he was unable to make sense out of 
6conf• III,5; ~. 32,686. 
7 Conf. VI,4; PL. 32,722: !IVa., vae, quibus gradibus deductus 
sum in profunda lnriri? Quippe laborans et aestuans inopla veri, 
cum te, Deus meus oum te non secundum intellectum mentls, ••• sed 
secundum sensum carnis quaererem. tr 
11 
most parts of the Old Testament and ot great sections of the New 
Testament. In order to understand the Scriptures he had to hear 
from St. Ambrose that the 'letter killeth, but the spirit giveth 
8 life l • 
Augustine was especially attrac~ed by the fundamental teachine 
of the Manicheans about the two independent Principles, the one 
good and the other evil. These existed independently and apart 
from one another from. all eternity. They were to be thought ot as 
coming into a conflict which resulted in the produotion of this 
world and of man. The evil Princ1ple more or less ooinoided with 
material being, which waa originally ohaos. Although the good 
Principle is ~poken of as spirit, it is not conceived as spiritual 
in the full technical sense. It is material in a lighter form, 
vapor-like in nature. The Father of Light is God, and the Prince 
of Darkness ia the devil. But unlike the Christian God, the Father 
of Light is .finite and limited. The Manichean God is limited by 
the existence of the independent Principle of Evil. Where the 
kingdom of the one begins, the other necessarily ends. 
Augustine himsel.f at this early time had no concept of a pure 
spirit or of an absolute substapoe. 9 Therefore it was hard for 
him to solve the problem of evil whioh pressed on his mind. As he 
8~. VI,Lu f!:. 32, 722. 
90on1!. IV,lb, ~.32, 706: "Sed quid mihi proderat, putanti 
quod tu, Domine Deus veritas, corpus esses lucidum et immensum, et 
ego frustrum~1e ill corpore? II 
12 
says, his piety could not admit the thought of God having created 
any evil nature.1o No wondar that he could not resist the Ma.niche-
an propaganda, since it boasted of giving an answer to his precise 
difficulties and doubts. ll 
During his stay in aathage in the company of' his- friends, 
Augustine also was confronted" with an argument against Manicheism 
whioh he oould not refute. It was Nebridius who advanced the dif-
flculty: What would the Principle of Darkness do against the Prin-
oiple of Light? It could either injure it or not injure it. If 
it could injure it, then the Prinoiple of Light was no real God. 
If the Prinoiple of Darkness could injure the Prinoiple of Light, 
then the latter did wrong in entering into confliot with the Prin-
ciple of Darkness and so imprisoning part of itself in darkness. 12 
This argument seemed irrefutable to Augustine. 
Beside the diffioulties against the Manichean creed as that 
raised by Nebridius, studies in astronomy made Augustine aware of 
1000nt. V, 10: PL. 32,715: nEt quia Deum bonum nullam ma.lam 
naturam-oriasse quaIrsoumque me piatas oredere oogebat, oonstitue-
bam ex adverso sibi duas moles, utramque infinitam, 3ed malam an-
gustius, benam grandius, at ex hoc initio pestilentioso me cetera 
saorilegla s.quebantur. 1I 
llIbld., III,7;PL. 32,688: tfNesoiebam enlm allud, vera quod es' 
et quasr-iCutele moviDa~t ut suffragarer atultis deoeptoribus, oum 
a ma quae~.retu~ una. malum est. Et utrum fo~ma corporea deus 
fin1~etur, at habe~et capillos et ungues ••• rt 
l2Ibid., VII,2; ~. 32,734. 
13 
of the soientific errors in the books of Mani. How then could M.ani, 
who olaimed to be the appearance of the Holy Ghost, be right in 
his teaching about other subjectq and about God himself, if he did 
not even know earthly sciencesi13 
Augustine passed many painful and distressful years in Carth-
age, full of inner embarrassment, waiting for Faustus. The Mani-
cheans said this man would solve all difficulties. Added to all 
his intellectual doubts "ere the actions of the Elects of the ~~ani-
cheans which he witnessed in Oarthage, some of whom behaved just 
opposite to their professed abhorrenoe of women; again from Rome 
came rumors about various scandals in the community of the Elect. 
For over nine years Augustine had waited 'nim1s extento S!!!-
derio,14 for the coming 01' Faustus. When Augustine was 28 years 
of age, he finally met Faustus and found him nothing more than a 
clever and agreeable talker, making no pretense at scienoe or phi-
losophy, and not very well read. He was unable to help solve any 
of Augustine t 8 doubts and diff1oulties.15 Faustus could not sayan, 
thi~new to Augustine and left him in a more desperate position he 
had ever been before. 
13conf., V ,5; PL. 32,709. 
- -
14Ibid., v,6; ~. 32,710. 
15Ibid.: "Ergo ubi venit, expertus sum hominem gratum et ju-
cundum verbis, at aa ipsa quae 111i solent dicere"multo suavius 
ga.rrientem ..... IQ1'I1 rebu3 tali bus satiatae ers.nt aures meae; nee 
ideo mihi mellora videbantur, quia Melius dicebantur; nee ideo 
vera, quia diserta; nee ideo sapiens, quia vultus congruus et de-
corum el01uium." 
14. 
Taking into consideration Augustine's accounts of his experi-
ences among the Manicheans, one oannot escape the conviction that 
he never wholly was a Manichean, that he neVer surrendered absolute 
ly to this system.16 But atter all these disapointments, especial-
ly with Faustus, his already weak Manichean beliefs all but dis-
solved. Nevertheless he did not break entirely with the Manichean~ 
he decided to go to Rome. The rashness ot this departure seems to 
indicate that he wanted to get rid of all that reminded him of his 
intense Manichean activity in Oarthage. He now sought completely 
new surroundings and a free atmosphere in which he could look tor 
the truth without an: narrowing presuppositions. When in spite of 
all his doubts Augustine remained wIthin the community of the Mani-
eheans, then the reason for this was that he still was unable to 
find another solution for the problem of evil than the doctrine ot 
the Manieheans that the evil which happens in us is not originated 
by us, but by another nature. This evil nature in us is part ot 
the evil Principle, which is materia. Because he could not con-
eeive a spiritual being he could not find a solution tor the 
17 problem of evil. 
16cont• VIII, 7 J PL. 32,757: "Et ieram per via.s pravas super-
stitione-iicrilega, non quidem certus in ea, sed quasi praeponens 
earn ceteris, quae non pie qua.erebam sed In1mice oppugnabam. fI 
17IbId., V,lO; PL. ,32,715: tJEt quoniam eum de Deo meo eogitare 
vellem,-cogitare nisr-moles corporum non noveram, neque enim vide-
batur mihi esse quIdquam quod tale non esse*, eammaxima et prope 
sola causa erat inevitabl1is erroris mel. tf 
Shortly after his s.rrivbl at Rome he fell into a dangerous 
illness that kept him in bed for a long time. Wnile recovering 
from his illne8 Augustine had much time to think, He no longer 
hoped to find in Manioheism the answer to his dlfficulties. He 
oame to the oonolusion that the position of the so oalled Aoademio 
was the one whieh would most fit hlm in all his doubts, He wanted 
to safeguard hlmself aga.lnst the danger of falling from the Mani-
chean error into some other error.18 
Yet Augustine was too passionate a seeker of the ultimate 
truth for academic scepticism to take a firm hold of him. 
turned from Maniohelsm to scepticism, the wish to consult a Chris-
tla. expert who was versed in the Scriptures beoame strong in him. 
After hearing mueh about the skill of Ambrose of Milan in explain-
ing the Holy Seriptures he aocepted the offer of profelsor in rhe-
torio In Milan. From Ambrose he learned how the <:)oriptures, espe-
oial1y the Old Testament, oould be explained in a spiritual way. 
Thus he beoame aware of the false interpretation of the Soriptures 
by the Manioheans who rejected the Old Testament completely becaus 
18conr., V,lO; PL. 32,715: "Etenim suborta est etiam mihi oogi-
tatlo;-prudentloreS-illos ceteris fuisae philosophos, quos Aoade-
micas appellant, quod de omnibus dubltandum esse oensuerunt, nee 
aliquid Veri ab homine comprehendi posse deereverunt." 
19Ibid., V,ll; PL. 32,716. 
- -
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~or them it contradicted the New Testament. His deeply rooted 
'materialism20 and his newly accepted scepticism hindered Augustine 
from a complete conversion to the Catholic Faith. Nevertheless he 
decided to beoome a catechumen until he would reach a de~lnitive 
solution ot his ditficulties. 21 
The turning point for a solution of the problem of evil was 
his acquaintance with Neoplatonism: uProcurastl mihi per quemdam 
hominem ••• quosdam Platonioorum libros ex graece lingua in latinarr 
versos. ,,22 
In hearing the sermons of Ambrose, Augustine had already be-
oome familiar with quite a ~ew elements of the Neoplatonic doctrine 
Ambrose himself used Plotinus in his exegetical sermons in such a 
way that he often found it unnecessary to change a word of Plotinus 
text. 23 Thus the Christianity which Augustine reoeived from Am-
brose was partly in Neoplatonic terms. On the other hand his later 
20Cont., v,14. PL. 32,718: "Tunc vero fortiter intend! animu.m, 
si quo modo possem certis sliqulbus documentis Maniohaeos oonvin-
oere falsitatis. Quod s1 possem spiritualem sUbstantiam oogita»e, 
statim maohinamenta ilIa omnia solvetentur et abjloerentur ex ani-
mo meoJ sed non poteram." 
21~. 
22 Ibid., VII,9. PL. 32,740. 
Gf. swiiiISki, Neoplatonism and the Ethios of st. AUfustine. After 
thorough studies Swlialskl oomes to ine ooncluSIon-- n agreement 
with ,P. Henry--that with'Libri Platonloorum' are meant the Enneads 
ot Plotinus. 
230r • Boyer, Ghrlstlanisme at neo-~latonisme dans 1a rormatio~ 
S!~. Auggstin, (Paris ,1920), p:-llO: ••• M. Couralle a-fa1t la 
preuve que ces memes sermons contiennt dtassez longs passages de 
Plotin, a peine retouches pour 1e;3 necessites de l' orthodoxie. ,~, es! 
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reading of the Platonists is done in the light of the Christian 
·doctrine. 24 It is impossible, however, to speak of Augustine's 
conversion to Neo-platonism, as Nolan B. Harmon does it in his ar-
ticle on St. Augustine. 25 Quite the contrary, because he had ab-
sorbed already too much of the Christian thoughts, Augustine found 
in the books of the Platonists great parts of the Christian teach-
Ing.26 As Barion says, even today the statement of St. Thomas 
about Augustlne's relation to P10tlnus must be regarded as true: 
"Augustlnus qui doctrine Platonlcorum 1mbutus fuerat, s1 qua lnve-
nit fidei aocomoda in eorum dictls, assumpsit; quae vero invenit 
fidei nostrae adveI'sa, in Melius oommutavlttr (S.Th.,I, qu. 84, a. 
5) • 
ainsi qu'AmbI'oise, dans son De Isaak (VIII,7o) suit manifestement, 
et parfois mot POuD mot, de a8veloppement du traite Sur le Beau 
de 1a premiere Enneade •••• C'est assez pour comprendre commenr-les 
verltes chretiennes arrivalent aux oreilles dtAugustin avec une re-
sonnanee en pa,rtle neo ... platoniolenne. If 
2401', 1;!;. Gilson, The Christian Philosoph~ of st. Augustine, 
trans. L.E. Lynch, (Ne~ork, 196,}, p. lo8~ !he-raet that Au-
gustine never had the slightest doubt about the purity of Plotinus' 
notion of creation, leads one at least to assume that, from the 
outset, he read the Enneads as a Ohristian." 
25Nolan B. Harmop, list. Augustine and the Problem of Bvil li , 
Relifion in Lite, (1944-45), p. 404: "In tact, Augustine throughout 
hIs Ire was profoundly influenoed by Plotinus, as he had been for 
a time a believer in this system--called neo-Platonism," 
Gf. Bar1on,Plotin und Au~ustinus, untersuChu~en !:!:!:!!LGottesproble~, (derl1n, 193;), p. li2: tf arln stlmme leh Holzu ... dass der Ein-
fluss des Neuplatonismus auf Augustin nicht als eine Bekehrung be-
zelehnet werden kann." 
26 8 Of, Boyer, p. 10 • 
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In the seventh book of the Confessions St. Augustine desoribes 
the great light and the knowledge he gained from reading the books 
of the Platonists. There he learned that we must turn away from 
the contemptible things of this material world and direct ourselves 
to the w~ld of spirit to fiad God a~ the eternal unchangeable 
Being.21 God becomes for Augustine the highest being, the highest 
good and pure spirit. This concept then of God as pure spirit 
enabled him to conceive evil not as a substance, but as non-being. 
Evil is the privation of the good which is due to a ns.ure. This 
muoh knowledge about the nature of evil was great progress. still 
the unoertainty about the root of evil caused him much inner painit 
In thls point, Christian doctrine, prob.bly as preached by St. 
Ambrose, was the most h.lpful souroe of an solution to the problem 
of evil. St. Ambrose namely, aiming at the Manicheans, insisted 
strongly that the sou.rce of our evil-doing is in our own :Cree will. 
Plotinll.8 had helped Augustine to overoome the Nanichean mate-
rialism and dualism. But for Augustine the Christian, Plotinus' 
solution was not sufficient. For Plotinus evil was non-being and 
270onf., VII,lO; PL. 32,746: "Sed tunc lectis Platonicorum 
illls lIOrIs, posteaqu8m inde admonitus quaerere incorpoream veri-
tatem, invisibilia tua, per ea, quae faeta Bunt, intellecta con-
apexi ••• " 
28Ibid., VII,7; PL. 32,739= "His itaque salvis atque incon-
cusae ro'6oratis in animo meo, quaerebam aestuans, unde sit malum. 
Quae illa tor~lenta, parturient1s cordis mei, qui gemitu'>, Deus 
maus." 
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and as such must be seen within the order of the whole univorse, 
where it has its determined place, thus contributing to the beau.ty 
of the cosmos. In the beginning Augustine embraces this solution 
with all his heart and he neV':9r deperls from this solution. But 
with the progress of years Augustine more end more moves away from 
the philosophers, making revelati ,n the great source of all his 
knol'lledge and searching. Correspondingly also the solution he 
gives to the problem of evil. gets a more theological aspect. The 
o~ly real evil tor hIm then Is immoral action, the evil that origi-
nates in the hQman tree will and Is the origin of all other evils. 
The problem of evil becomes intimately connected then with the 
revealed truths about original sin, inoarnation and redemption, 
truths which the philosophers are unable to find. The tlnal solu-
tion ot the problem of evil then becomes for him the beliet in the 
all-surpassing love and goodness ot God. 
CHAPTER II 
PHYSICAL EVIL 
A. The Constituents of Good 
1. ~ ~ summum !!..!!. II summum bonum 
Augustinets solution or the problem of evil is strongly de-
termined by the most characteristic and outstanding trait of his 
thinking and writing: his theocentric orientation. All Augustine' 
thinking and explaining takes its start from the point of God as 
the higheat being and the cause of everything that exists. This 
theoeentric point of view was not lea,rned from Plotinus, but was 
implanted into his heart from his mother in his earliest childhood 
Even his becoming a Manichean was motivated by the desire to main-
tain the concept of God immaculate. He preferred to accept a sub-
stantial evil principle than to be forced to declare God as the 
cause of evil. It 1s true, only the reading of the Neoplatonie 
books enabled him to conceive God as the ultimate cause of all 
beings. Yet Neoplatonism did not effect a completely new directio 
in Augustinefs thoughts but only gave him the philosophical tools 
20 
21 
to express his most inner longing.l 
If, therefore, we want to understand the method and the solu-
of the problem of evil in St. Augustine, we have to know first 
what 'God t means for him. With regard to the Manicheans Augustine 
SB.yS explicitly that a correct concept of God would have saved 
them from their ridiculous thinking about evil. 2 
God is for Augustine the highest being, summum esse. 3 Being, 
........................ -
however, does not mean a mere factual existence , bare of all va-
lue, but means goodness as such. All the creatures that exist re-
ceived their being from God and so represent in different degrees 
the infinite being of God. In them Augustine points out how valu-
able being is and how much preferable to non-being. For all beings 
strive and tight to keep their existence. All human beings, even 
those who are unhappy, choose to live. If they are asked what theJ 
prefer, it is existence over non-existence, ~nose who commit sui-
cide, in realIty do not want non-existence but they look for peace. 
And what is peace other than ordered being. "The whole object of 
lLe Roy Burton, The Problem of Evil, A Criticism of the Augus-
tinian Point of Vlew,-rchlcago 19I7);--In thIs book the-aUjhor 
reproaches Augustine beoause of this theocentrlc attitude and trie~ 
to prove that it hindered Augustine in finding e. final solu.tion of 
the prOblem ot evil. However, as an extreme evolutionist Le Roy 
Burton is unwilling end .nable to accept that only a theocentrical 
ph11~sophizing can reach a solution in this problem. 
2De Givitate Dei, XI,22J PL. 41,336 
...-..- . ----- ........ 
3De Moribus Manichaeorum, 1; !&. 32,1345 
2? 
wanting to die is not non-existence but re~t. So while such a man 
erroneously believes that he will no longer exist, his nature longs 
to be at rest, that Is, to have fulleI" beli.g ... 4 
If all created being is 30 valuable that no nature wants to 
lo.e It, how much more valuable must be that belng, that Is Being 
itselt, the belng that has no contact with non-belng at all. 
"Hoc enlm Intellecto atque perfeoto, slmul vide rent Id 
esse quod summe ao prlm1tus esse rectls81me dlcitur. 
Hoc enim maxime esse dicendum eat, quod semper eodem 
modo se •• habet, quod omnimodo sui alml1e est, quod 
nulla ex parte cOl"rumpi ac mutari potest, quod non sub-jaoet tempori, Quod aliter nunc S8 habere quam habebat 
ante., non potesta Id enlm est quod ease veriasim. 
dioitur. Subest enlm huia verba manentls in se atque 
incommunicabl1iter seS8 habentis naturae signlfioatio. 
Hanc nihil allud quam Deum pOSSUMUS dicere, cui sl con-
trarium recte quaeras, nihil omnino est. Esse enim 
contrarlum non habet, nisl non esse. Nulla eat ergo 
Deo natura contrarla."~ 
31noe God Is the highest good and is being itself, He is absolutel, 
unohangeable. This unchangeableness of God is for Augustine the 
most cha~acterlstl0 mark or God's infinIte superlority above all 
creatures. Theae are all ohangeable because they are oreated out 
ot nothingne s s. 
All consideratIons about the changeable creatures lead Augus-
tine to that Being that is the origin of the existenoe ot all and 
is being in all its tullness, goodness, immutabIlIty and eternity. 
4De Libero Arblttio, III,S, PL. 32, 1282: "Omnia itaque 11le 
appetltus In voluniate mortis, non-ut qul moritu» non slt, sed ut 
requieaoat Intenditur. Ita cum errore oredat non se tuturum, ne-
tUI"B tamen quietus e.ae, hoo est magis 8sse desiderat." 
5D8 Moribua Maniohaeorum, 1; PL. 32, 1345. 
............ -
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If we want to understand the finite things, we have to see them in 
their relation to their orlgin and cause, the highest good. 
Augustine enumerates three reasons for the ;:;;oodness of a.ll 
creatures. These reasons correspond in a certain way to the three 
causes: the efficient cause, the formal cause and tho final cause. 
Just as these causes are most intimately connected with one anotheli 
so the reasons Augustine gives oannot be perfectly distlnguished 
from one another. 
The reasons are: 1) all things are good beoause they are ore-
a.ted by God; 2) they are good beoause they partioipate in bein,.~ 
with its three attributes of measure, form and order) 3) all things 
are good beoause they are parts of the universal order. These 
three reasons we will consider now. 
It 1s a fundamental axiom of Augustine's teaching that all 
finite substances are oreated by a free aot of Godts will. This 
doctrine is displayed in the explicit distinotion between the crea-
tures whioh received their existenoe through the will of God, from 
the eternal Son of' God who prooeded .from the essence of God: 
"Ego non solum anicam, {:led et corpus nostrum at omnem 
creaturam at spiritualem et corporal em ex Deo esse 
dico ••• Sed allud est quod de se Deus genu1t, quod hoc 
est quod ipse, ali'-cAd quod fecit Deus. Q,uod Deus genuit, 
aequale est Patri.: quod Deus fecit, non e :It aequale oon-
ditum conditorl."O 
~De Act1bu3 ~ Felice, 1I,16; ~. 42,516 
All finite creatures, although not good in the same way as 
God is good, are good because they are caused by God. For a. good 
cause cannot have a ba.d effect. God, the Summum Bonum, whom noth.iri 
can hinder in His activity, cannot produce anything evil. This 
statement of the goodness of all nat~res is basic in Augustine's 
conceptIon of the world and tor his solution of the problem of 
evil. 'Ne find it repeated again and again in the context of this 
problem. 7 
Yet to explain the different degrees of goodness in Godts 
creation, it is not surficie;~Lt to regard them from their efficient 
cause, For this is the same one for all creatures. It is the 
iru~er formal cause that makes these differences in goodness under-
standable. All things are good, because they participate in being. 
and they are not all alike because God gave each of them a diffe-
rent degree of being.8 Those things that received a higher degree 
of being are better and nearer to the highest good than those whie! 
received a lesser degree. So there is a broad scale of goodness 
7De Natura Boni, 19; PL. 42,557: ~Omnis natura itaque bona 
est, etomne bonUiii8.' Deo eSt: omnia ergo natura a Deo est," 
8De GIvltato Dei, XII,2; PL. 41,350: !laum enim Deus assentia 
sit, hoc est summe-sIt, at ideo-immutabills sltz rabus quae ex 
nihl10 oreavlt, esse dedit, sed non 3U.rome esse, sicut ipse est; at 
ellis dedit esse amplius, a1iis minus; atque ita natures essentia-
rum gradibus ordlnavlt." 
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in the world, from the lowest form of dead matter which is near 
the abyss ot nothingness, up to the highest torm of created good-
ness, the spirits, which with their correctly ordinated wills Dnd 
intellects partake in the life of God in the Beatific Vision. 
If Ode asks Augustine about the .characteristic marks of being 
that make all things to be good and to be good in all different 
degrees, he aBswers that there are three generic goods: 'modus', 
'species', and ~rdot. By contributing these generic goods to things 
God gives them their existenoe and plaoes them within the whole of 
the universe. Thus the measure, form and order not only constitube 
the conoept but the real and essential criteria of being: 
"Ham nemo formara et ere are corpora nisi Deus potest: 
neque enim oreanturA nisi cum eis modus et species et 
orda subsistit,~ •• "~ 
Where these generic goods are found, there is an existing creature, 
which is a good; where they are not, there 1s nothing at all,10 
To some things God gives more of these generic goods and to others 
less and thus there arises the endless realm of creatures. ll These 
9Q!. Natura~. 18) ~. 42,556. 
lOIbid., 23: "Ubi aliquis modus, aliqua speoies, aliquis ordo, 
aliquidbOnum aliqua natura est: ubi autem nullus modus, nulla ape-
cies, nullus ordo est, nullum bonum, nulla natura e:1t." 
llIbid., 3; PL. 42,553: "Omnia cnim quanta magis moderata, 
speciosa, ordlnata sunt, tanto magis uti~e bona sunt: quanto auteD 
minus moderata, minus speoiosa, minus ordinata sunt, minus bona 
sunt." 
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goods are so much the oonstituents of a oreature that a being of 
higher degree of measure, form,and order, although it is corrupted, 
always rem.ains bettep than another be1ncl of a lower degree. As 
proof for this statement Augustine points to the general estimH-
tion whioh gold has among men. Although gold may be somehow cor-
rupted, nevertheless men ase in it a higher value than in uncorrup-
ted silver. And in the same way, he says, is a corrupted spiritual 
being of a higher degree of goodness than any inanimate being. 12 
If ~ll creatures would preserve their special measure, form, and 
orde~, there would oe no evil at all.13 
The generio good of measure, form, and order, which constitute 
things as good in themselves, have also the connotation of the 
relationship to the whole of creation. To be within the universal 
order for Augustine attributes to things a. special value.. Measure 
not only means a well ppoportioned re~ationship between unity and 
multiplicity within the single creatupe, but means also that this 
oreatux-e is so proportioned that it fits well into the whole as a 
part. EVan more has order of the single thl11g a relationship to 
the opder of the Nhole. Order generally speaking means for 
Augustine the law of God's wisdom, which oomprehends all and with-
out wni~h nothing in God's universe exists or happens. Outsid~ of 
12:qe Natura .§2!!!" 5; l:!!. 42, 553. 
13~., 31; ~. 42, 563. 
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God's order sin and error cannot exist or cause anything else to 
exi8t.14 
B. The Nature and the Origin ot Physical Evil 
a. Prelim1na£l questions 
Since everything that is, is good, there is only one answer 
to the question about the essenae of evil: EvIl i8 'nothing'. That 
indeed, is Augustinets anllwer. "Deus, qui paucis ad id quod veI'e 
est retugientibus, ostendis malum nihil esse."lS 
With this answer, however, AUgUstine is tar from saying that 
there is no evil In this world. Augustine sees the life of man 
so afflicted with all kinds of evils that many were inolined to 
oall Augustine a pessimist ot the worst kind. His own life had 
been too painful with all the doubts and spiritual vexations for 
him to oveI'look the pI'esence ot evil in this world. In the Citz 
of God he paints the miseI'ies ot this llte in a compact way. 
--
are encompassed with ev11s", he says, "and no flood ot eloquence 
can suftice to detail the miserIes of this 1Ite."16 Each single 
person is surrounded bT dangers and the seed of destruction is in 
him trom tne fIrst day of lIte. He recounts the sicknesses that 
14D& Ordlne, I, c. 6; PL. 32,985: "Oausarum autem series 01'-
dIne Includltur. Et error IPse non solum gignitur causa, sed etlam 
glgnit aliquld cujus oausa sit. Quamobrem quo extra ordinem non 
est, eo non iotest oI'dini esse contrarius ••• Et bona et'mala in 
ordine sunt. 
l5501iloq., I, a.l,n. 2; ~. 32,869 
l6De 01vltate Del. XIX. 1.1.1 PL. u.l.627 s. 
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harm or even destroy beauty and health,l? and before which nobody 
1s secure, not even the wise man: 
"The amputation or decay of the members of the body 
puts an end to its integrity) deformity blIghts its 
beauty, weakness its health, lassitude its vigour, 
sleepiness or sluggianness its activity and which 
of these is it that it may not assail the flesh of 
the "lse man?" 16 
Even the virtues, though they hold the Ilhighest place among good 
things, have as their sale ocoupation to wage perpetual war with 
vices, not those that are outside of us, but within. tJ19 So the 
very virtues of this lite, Which are the highest goods and "most 
useful possessions", bring with them. war and are "all the more 
telling proofs of 11te's miseries as they are helpful against the 
violence of life's dangers, toils and woes.,,20 
Augustine turns to recount the miseries ot sooial life, con-
sidering friendships, family, state and the oommunity of m.ankind. 
He conclude s a 
"Let every one, then, who thinks with pain on all these 
great evils, so horrible, so ruthless, acknowledge 
that this is misery. And if anyone either endures or 
thinks of them without mental pain, this is a more 
miaereble plight still, for he thinkLhimselt happy 
because he has lost human feeling." Z~ 
17De Clvi1Jate Del, XXII, 22. 
- -
18Ib1d., XIX, 4. 
-
20Ibid• 
21~., XI, 7. 
Not are there evils only within man and evils produced by the 
co~~mdty or man, the whole or nature may become an endless dange 
for the human being. There are~xtreme heats and cold, storms, 
floods, inundations, lightning, thunder, hail, earthquakes ll • Ther 
are dangers "from the painful or even deadly bites of wild animals 
from the madness which a mad dog oommlnioates, so that even the 
animal whioh of all others is most gentle and friendly to its own 
master, becomes an object of more intense fear than a lion or 
dragon". 22 '30 Augustine calls this life here on earth an "intini t 
17 deep sea of bitterness".22 
The answer then that evil is nihil does not intend to deny in 
form of a superficial optimism the real presence of evils in this 
world, but it is founded on Augustine's ooncept of God and of 
existence as such. God is the:;upre1ile B&i:J:6 and evil is, as the 
Manicheans correotly say, the opposite of God. Yet the opposite 
to the Supreme BaiBi is not a supreme evil substance, but nihil. 
An evil substance would be a contradiction in itself. For sub-
stance means existenee,and all existence is good. 
Asked what evil positively is, Augustine's answer is that in 
the strictest sense there is only one evil: sin. But there 1s 
another kind of evil connected with the first one: punishment for 
22De Civltate Dei, XXII, 22. 
- -
30 
sin. However, this is a.lr-eady 'evil t in a broader sense. 23 In an 
even wider- sense 'evil' is the so oalled physioal evil, ":lich is 
conditioned oy the Itmitation ot' created oeinga.24 
This limitation itself, however, Auguatine does not regard as 
an evil. Everything is good in sO f~ as it oonta1ns the goodness 
o£ its species. That the one species contains less perfeotion 
than another species 1s not an evil. Sometimes6 Augustine says, 
the lower speoies is oalled evil in comparison with a higher spe-
oies,2$ but that is a very improper way of speaking. A oomplete-
1'1 developed animal is not ugly in itself but only ln comparison 
with the humHn being.,a) Thus Augustine rejects an evil as the mere 
absenoe of higher goods which do not belong to the essence ot' the 
23ctr• FortunatQm, 15; PL. 42,117: "Nam omnia Deus bona fecit, 
et bene ordinavl£; peccatum autem non fecit: et hoc est solum quod 
dioitur malum, voluntarium nostrum peooatum. Est et aliud genus 
mali, quod est poena peccati. CUm ergo duo sint genera malorum, 
paceatum at poena peocatiJ peocatum ad Deum non pertinet, poena 
pecoatl ad vindicem pertinet." 
24ota-. Fallstum Manich.; 22; PL. 42,450: "Ac per hoc in omnibus 
qllae humaDa lntlrmitas norret aut timet, sola iniquitas jure dam-
naturl caetere. sunt vel tributa naturarum, vel merita culparum." 
2"De Natura Bonl, 23J PL. 42,5.58: "Item species mala vel in 
comparatIone dloi~£ormos!Orls atque pulch~lorist quod ista sit 
minor species, illa major, non mole, sed decore. H 
26Ibid., 11U PL.42,555: ft •••• 8iout in homlnis forma quia ma-jor est-putohrltudo, in ejus oomparatione simiae pulohritudo de-
formitas dleitur:,et lalllt imprudentes, tanquam illud sit bonum, 
at hoo malum} nee Intendunt in corpore slmiae Dlodum proprium ••• tt 
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speoies. These limitations are the presuppositions for the exis-
tenoe of minor goods by which the 'beauty of the cosmos is construc 
ted. nEt quia non aequalia omnia fecisti, ideo sunt omnia; quia 
singula bona. aunt et slmul om.."lia valda bona.,,2-7 We must therefore 
say that the limitation of goodness ~n each species for Augustine 
is not an evil. It is not an evil to be less good. 28 One could 
call it a metaphysical imperfection, because eaoh species realizes 
only a limited aspect of intinite being. But since this lim1tatio 
specifies only the positive though limited a3pect otbaing, and 
thus is not 'contra naturam' but 'secundum naturam~ it is not an 
evil. 
On the other hand, since created being is not the absolute 
highest being, this :fa.ct of limitation makes it possible for the 
single examplar not to accomplish the whole perfection of what it 
should be. It makes it possible for it to be rObbed of goods it 
21cont., VII, 18. 
ct. De tG:'tura Boni, 16, !!!_ 42,55Q~ ttQuae taman stiam privationes 
rerum sic ordin0ntur 1n universitate naturae, ut sapienter consi. 
derant1bus non indecenter vioes suas habeant. Ham et Deus carta 
loca et tempora non illumlnando, tenebras teoit tam deoenter quam 
dies. 3io._ nos oontlnendo vooant, decenter interponimus In 
loquendo s11entium, quanto magis il1e quarundam rerum privationes 
decenter facit, sicut rerum omnium pertectus artitex?" 
28contra ~E. Manich.~ o. 31; PL. 42,191: Accusing Manichaeum 
Augustine sarsl loquitur 'de Intim1S at pro sui generis modulo in 
imc rerum ordlnatis bonis; quae dum comparantur suporiorlbus vItu-
perandis ab imperit1s exist1mantur, at dum consideratur quantum hi 
desit boni, quod 111is adest, ejusdem boni absentia mali nomen 
tenet." 
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should have. The specifio metaphysioal essenoe of finite beings 
inoludes a fmo~et o~ flesa' in its physioal realization. That 
means: An animal is in its essential goodness always better than a 
stone. This eS:3ential goodness remains as long as the subject 
exists. However, if a dog, for example, loses a leg or gets siok 
somehow, it does not rep~esent the Whole beauty and. goodness that 
it should have. Therefo~e, the dog is afflicted with physioal evil 
It laoks of an aooidental being which is neoess&ry for the full 
realization ot its nature, Here we find not only absence of good-
ness but privat1~n of goodness. 
The question is: does Augustine think that the necessary oon-
sequenoes ot the existenoe of limited oorporeal bel!~s, such as 
siokness and suffe~ing and death, are real evi~s? Many oritios 
answered f no', and looking back to whs.t we have seen about the 
goodness everything gets by being within the order of the universe, 
we would also be tem.pted to give a negative ana_or. Such an answer 
however, would not be correot. 
Saying that those evila not due to t~ee will ~e either punis! 
ment or 'caused by the limits ot the lowest oreatures in which the 
one generation has to Vanish and give plaoe to another l ,29 Augus-
29ctr• Seound. Manich., 15; PL. 42.596: "Neo tamen omnem de-
fectum me oulpabilem, sed solum. voluntarium, quo anima rational!s 
ad ea quae inf~a illam sunt condita oondito~e suo deserto declinat 
a.ffectumj hoo est enim quod pe·ooatum vooatur. Caeteri autem de-
feotus qui non sunt voluntarii, vel poenales aunt, ut peooata puni-
antur moderatrice summa atque ordinatrice justitia; vel men~uris 
rerum in.fimarum interveniunt, ut praeoedentia sucoedentibus oedant. 
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tinus unambiguously aoknowledges physioal evil as real evil. It 
is true that Augustine stresses at different times that this phy-
sical evil cannot be called evil in the strictest sense: "Omnium 
igitur corruptionum sola quae vltiosa est corruptia pecte vltupe-
ratur: caeterae, autem, aut ne oorruptiones quidem dioandae sunt, 
aut carte quia vitiosae non sunt, dlgnae vituperatione esse non 
pO.:3sunt. "30 
Wh.sn Augustine pronounoes that "there are only two kinds of 
ev1ls, sin and penalty of sinff,31 this must be L1nderstood as cor-
responding to what mostly aosorbes his interest: God, and man in 
his relation to God. "\Vhat do you want to know?" he asks himself, 
and his a.nSW$r 1'51 ftGod and the soul I wa.nt to knoW'. --Nothing else 
No, nothing $188."32 Therefore such a statement as above must not 
31J. Mausbach, Die Ethik des Hailigan A!f$ustinus, (Freiburg 
i.:8r., 1929), vol. tr;-p. !53."'1fire Mausoac'fi repraaohes Augustine 
for limiting with this statement the problem of evil on an insuf-
fioient basis: "Daa Dilemma, von dem er auszugehen scheint, jedes 
fibel mUsse entweder Schuld oder ·"3trafe sein, 1st unvollstandi,_" und 
als Grundlage einer vollstindigen Theodizee nicht zu verwerten." 
But on the other hand Mausbach is forced to oonoede that Augustine 
himself apparently does not under~tand this division of evil l~to 
sin and punishment 1n an exclusive way: "D1.se Einte1lling der -3bel 
(i.n\;3unde undo Strate) ersoheint nicht vol1standig; sie 1f1rd aueh 
von Augustinus nicht iiberall als ausschliessliche gefasst ••• " (Ioi 
vol. I, P. 111·112) 
325011109.' I, 2; PL. 32,072. 
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be understood • sensu exclusivo' and it does not deny the reality 
of physical evils which are conditioned by the metaphysical imper-
tection of created beings. 
b. The essence of evil 
- --
Atter having seen that Augustine acknowledges physical evil 
as real evil, although only in a broader sense, let us now oon-
sider what Augustine points out as charaoteristic of evil in its 
essence and its origin. 
Augustine assigns corruption as the most outstanding oharao-
ter ot evil. 
"Quls eo1m dubitet totum illud quod dicitur Malum, 
nihil esse allud quam oorruptionsm? Possunt qui-
de. aliis atque alils vooabulis alia atque alla 
mala noainari: sed quod omnium rerum malum sit, in 
qui bus mali aliquid animadVert! potest, oorruptio 
est. "33 
Oorruption, however, can only exist in something good. Thus the 
very corruption itselt proves that the subject, which is corrupted, 
is good. 
Slnoe goodness means partioipation in being, in existence, 
evil as oorruption, as privation ot goodness, is In the same way 
privation ot beIng. Evil is defection trom being, a tendency 
toward nothingnessc "malum tendit ad o1hl1um. u With the growing 
ot evil, being is diminished. Should goodness become totally cor-
33Ctr. !2. Manich., c. 35; ~. 42, 201. 
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rupted, the existing nature would vanish. Finally 1t the nature 
disappears completely, corruption also disappears, because corrup-
tion can only be in a good nature. 34 
As .e have seen earlier, the goodness ot a subject is consti-
tuted by the generic goods ot measure, torm and order. All beings 
can exist only by participating in these generic goods. Evil, 
theretore, is a corruption ot these modes ot being: "Malum nihil 
alud est quam corrupt10 vel privatio modi vel speciel vel ordinis 
naturalis. n35 Evil deprives the thing ot its measure, torm and 
beauty, and its order. But it cannot be a complete deprivation 
.1thout aestroy1ng completely the subject and with it the evil 
itselt. 
Theretore, it is quite apparent that there cannot be an evil 
substance. ~o make this absolutely clear, is the ma1n purpose 
Augustine pursues in his considerations about phys1cal evils. A 
scorpion, tor instance, is not an evil substance, as'~ the Maniehe-
ana say. For the scorpion is beautiful in its kind, full of order 
mea.ure and form. Even less, ean there be a sO called highest 
evil substance, as the Manioneana conoeive it. "Evil is that Whic} 
l4Ctr• !2. Manich., d. 16, ~. 42. 205: " ••• quanto magis 
augetur corruptl0. tanto matts tendit ut non sit." 
35Q! Natura!2!!!, c. 4; .f!;.. 42, 553. 
)6 
talls away trom eSlence and tends to non-exlstenoe.,,36 Thus the 
highest evil would be non-existence, that lSI nothIng. Evil is 
alway8 against the natUl'e of a subject ot which it is an evil: 
"Quod aut.m malum,. non· natura, sed contra naturam est. n)1 
Conside1'iDg generally what can exist and what really exists, 
Augustine classifies all beings in three kinds of gOodsl tbona 
vitiata' o1"viti08.', goods which are corrupted by an evil; 'bona 
incorrupta', goods whioh a1'8 !"re. trom any evil and thel'etoIte aIta 
ot a higher Itank among goods, finally there is a 'bonum incorrup-
tibile', whieh .annot be affected by an evi1.38 This absolutely 
good nature, which 1s God, Iteally exists, but there cannot be an 
absolute evil natupe. 
Now, to evaluate ooItItectly the descl"lptions .. and definition, 
Augustine gives ot evil as cOl'l'uptl0, dereotus, pr1vat10, amiasio 
i 
boni, .e have to ke.p 1n mind that they are born in the polemic 
-
situation against the Vanicheans. Against them he has to avoid 
any indication that he regards evil as a palpable reality; tor the 
Man1chaana would have understood Dr such a concept a substantial 
reality. Thereforo, in his tight against ManieheisM, Augustine 
views m01'8 or 18ss only the formal aspect ot evil. 
)6D8 M01'lb. Manioh., c. 2; PL. 32, 1346z "Idipsum .I-IOtO malum 
est •••• ~.t!c.l'. a6 .ssent!a et &aId tendere ut non git.~ 
37Q!!:.. !2. Manich •• c. 33; ~. 42, 199; cf • .!E.!5!., c .. 35. 
38~ Clvltate R!!. XII, 3. ~. 41, 351. 
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Th1s formal aspect shows evil 1n its metaphysical essence and 
as such evil 1s mere privation of goodness, want1ng in substance, 
truth and,beauty_ The material aspect on the contrary shows the 
concrete object in its totality, as a SUbstantial being with all 
its acoidental determinations. Viewing this aspect of evil Augus-
tine wauld have had to describe the concrete Object in so far as 
it is affected with evil. 39 
Now, generally considering the formal aspect ot eVil, Augus-
tine avoids having to speak about evil things or men. But Augus-
tine does not den7 the material aspect. ae is not afraid to call 
a C01"'rupted nature bad, although, when sa7ing so, he never omits 
to stress that in so far as there is a natu!'e, it is a good: 
"ala itaque natura dicitur, quae corl'Upta est: nam in-
corrupta utique bona est. Sed etiam corrupta, inquan-
tum .najura 8st, bona eat; inquantum corrupta est, mala 
est." 40 
Not only the corruption in an apple is bad (evil), but the corrup-
39ct• Nll'sohl, ~l'spru~ ~ Wesen !!! BOlen nach del' Lehre 
des Hl. Augustinua, tR.gen~urg, 18>4), p.71. IlrachI iiIl aesor 
lEIs~istilnollon between the formal and material aspect • calling 
them 1m. subjeotlve and objective poInt of vie.. ae writea2 "1m 
e:raten Falle (1.e. 1n the subjeotive polnt,ot view) betrachtet man 
das boa. SUbj.kt 1n seiner verkehPten Gesinnung und !itlgkelt, und 
du-UJIl wiN man e shier m.1 t del' SUnde, ihl'en verschiedenen Arten 
una Graden au tun bahen. Im zweiten Falle wird vom bosen 3ubjekte 
ginzlich abatrflhiert. und das B6se in selnem objektiven Sein zu 
begrelten una 1n •• 1nam Verhiltlusse zum Subjekte zu bestlmmen ge-
aucht. Diese Betrachtungsweise glbt uns den abstrakten Begriff 
des BOsen, des Bosen als selchen, .(hrend jene den konkreten zu 
erm1tteln hat." 
4°De Natura~. c. 4; ~. 42, 553. 
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ted apple itself i8 bad and as such it can infeot all other apples 
wh.lch lie in contact with it. Augustine never denied thi s very 
ooncrete reality, which evil has in this world, and its power to 
infect and to spread out. In his fIght with the Manlcheans, how-
ever, he purposely restricted his consideration to the formal 
aspect of evIl. 
In the ~~~loso2hie des Christentum~, Staudenmaier points out 
that all the Fathers of the Church, agreeing with Augustine in 
defending the negative oharaeter ot evil, at the same time neVEH't 
deny the objective reality and positive power of evil in this 
.0rld.41 
It is to be noted that in his later years, especially in his 
fight against the Pelagians, Augustine had to switch over to the 
more 'natural' use of the word M8lum.42 This is to say that the 
Pelagians forced him to speak about the corrupted nature itself, 
not only about the eorpuptlon withIn the good nature. 
4lstaudenmaier, Die Philosophi. des Chrlstentwas, P. 553: 
IIDenn .enn auch alle rn:cnenvlte~'" darTiliiDeroeinstimmen, dass das 
B~se nioht ein wahrhatt Reales, ein Seln 1n wirkllcher Wahrheit 
seIJ denn wahrhaft 1st nur, was aua Gott 1st, und das 1st das Gute, 
so haben sle dessen ungeachtet nle die objektlve Wlrkliohkeit des 
Sasen, sowie des streben desselben als ein dem Guten pos1tiv ent-
gegengesetstes geleugnet." 
42Mausbach. vol. I. p. 110. 
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c, !h! Qrigin £! Physical !!!! 
Now that we have seen what Augustine understands by ph~sical 
eVil, namely a privatio ~ debiti, we have to find out where he 
indicates the origin of evil is. Since the negative ohars.cter of 
evil shows it as disagreement with nature and having no: substance 
of its own, Augustine puts to himself the quastion:IfWhence then 
is it?t~ To find the answer to this question, he says, we have to 
look for the end. to Which all evil leads. This end is non-exis-
tence, is nothingness. In corruption entitles tall away trom 
their being, This means that they are brought to noncontinuanoe, 
which is the same as non-existence. While the growing in goodness 
and gaining in bein3 oan only come from God, because it is an 
approaching to God, evil and corruption can only come from nothing-
ness,because it i9 a ten10noy toward nothingness: 
nEt cum ista titi proposuerls esse at non-essG, atque 
cognoverls quante magis augetur speoies, tanto quid-
~le tendere ut sit; quanto magis augetur corruptio, 
tanto magis tender. ut non sit: quid dubitas dicere 
in unaquaque natura corruptibili quid in es sit ex 
Deo, quid sit ex nihiloJ cum specie. ~ecundum na-
t~a.'n sit, corruptio contra naturam. "L~J 
Augustine'. greatest concern in dealing with the problem of 
evil is to prove that God is not the oause of evil. Considering 
evil under the formal aspect, namely as absence of being and good-
ness, it is not too diffioult for him to acoomplish this task. For 
what has no existence, ~lat is nothing, needs no cause at Dll. 
Therefore God can not be the cause of evil, of the absence of good-
ness. 
Howeve!.~, if we conside::." evil under the material a.spect, than 
we must say that the evil corrupted nature has been made by God. 
Yet it is not what is covr.upted in this creature that 1s f:t'om God, 
but only the nature; in so tar as it is good. Augustine even says 
that the natures as tar as', they art) corruptible, are not from God. 
"Non faceret Deus naturaa corruptibl1es. In quantum anim natu.t-ae 
aunt, Deus fecit; 1n quantum autem corruptlbl1es, non Deus fecit; 
non enim est ab 1110 corruptl0, qui salus est incorruptibllis. II44-
As the context proves, this oorruetlbll1s must not be under-
stood 1n the strict sense as the poss1bll1tyfor corruption. For 
the posslb111tl tor corruption is at the same time the possibilIty 
for improvement and as such it cannot be called evil. Even matter, 
Augustine says, 1s good, for if the actual being 1s good. then 
also the eapabl11ty to the good,whloh represents the unformed but 
formable matter, is not an ev1l.45 It theretore the statement 
44ctr_ i2_ Manich. te. 38; l.!:.- ,42, 20). 
45De Nat\l.J.1'8; Bonl, c. 18. ~., 42, 556 s: ltPorro s1 bonum all ... 
quod es~torma. unde qu1 es. praevalent. tormos! appellantur, siout 
a specie specios!, procul dubio bonum aliquod est etiam capaoitss 
formae. S1cut quia bonum est sapientia, namo dubltat quod bonum 
5i t capacem esse sapientlae,Et:qUia OIl'Jle bonum a Deo, neminem 
oportet dub1tare, et1am istam, 81 qua est, mater1am non esse ni3i 
a Deo." 
that corruptible natures, in so tar as they are corruptible, are 
not made by God, is to have any sense at all, Augustine must under-
stand by 'corruptible natures' actually corrupted natures or even 
more probably the actual limitation ot natures, which always in-
cludes actual absence or goodness~46 . 
In this regard the question arises whether Augustine makes the 
'nihil' into a substantial principle. One cannot deny that it is 
very misleading When Augustine says that the corruption is not 'ex 
Deo sed ex nlhilo' or that as the species and the 'tendere ad esse' 
is trom God so the corruption or the 'tendere ad nihilumt is ~ 
nihilo. Among other, Trepte, tor Instance concludes trom such 
statements that St. Augustine is not consistent in his oonception 
ot nothingness. It is true, Trepte says, that Augustine at ditte ... 
rent times very clearly detines • nihil' as the absolute nothingnesa 
So tor instance In Contra Jullanum,I, 8: 
"Non quIa nIhil habet sliquam vim; si enim habet, non 
nihil. sed &liquid esset. Nthil nec corpus est ullus 
nee spiritus nee substantiis aliquid accIdens nec in-
tormi. aliqua materia nec inanis locus nec ipsae tene-
brae, sed prorsus nIhil. Nihilo naturam faotoris a na-
tupa eorum, quae tacta sunt. disce~nimus." 
In this sense howover, Trepte says, the metaphysical impertection 
cannot explain the corruptibility ot the creatures. Metaphysical 
46It appears to miL that in this and similar expressions Augus-
tine comes very near to Leibn1z t metapbfsioal evil. looking upon 
all lImitation as impossibly coming trom God--because it is thought 
to be evil. 
Impe~tectlon become. somethIng poaltlve, the otherwise po.erlesa 
nihil Is ooncelved as havIng a certaln po.ex-. For otherwise the 
nihil cou.ld not b. the basis for a chanae ot the tONS and essences 
a8 they come out ot the hands of the Cre.tor.47 
Trapte thinks Augustine had oome to this concept of a powex-tul 
nihIl because at his the0rJ of oreation. As ChI-iat 18 born out of 
God and therefore is InfInite, 80 the oreature., because the1 are 
born out of nothing. ax-e Impex-tect. Trepte thinks that thl. com-
parison prov.s his interpPetation of Augustine's concept ot nihil 
a. a poaltlve princIple. He aa18 alsol "The natural impex-fectlon 
baa to be ... n as the Inhex-ited nothing, out at wblch the oreature 
has been formed, and it the nothlna ha. a oertain qualltJ, then 
alao the imperfeotion can have a certaIn power and make pos81ble a 
ohanae In the oreature. ,,48 
Althoush there -7 be some misleading statem.nts in Ausustlne" 
_x-ltinga. the,. do not juatlf7 auch an lnterpx-etatlon ot the role at 
the g1h11 In Ausustlne's explanation ot the origin or e,,11. The 
vel""f taot tbat Augustine in all hls wrltinas after his convex-slon 
abow. such. cle.x- ooncept ot tbe pupel,. negative charaoter of 
nothIngness, should make one doubtful that ~ch an aoute thinker 
47T~ept.f p. S. "Neln, dIe .etaphyalsche Unvollkommenhalt kenn 
In aex- PON, .la al. oben AugustIn setas':Jt ha.ben wl11, nicht di. 
Verderbbax-kelt der Ire.tar erklaren. Sle ist vielmehr bier Augustlr. 
unter dar Hand au at ... Posltivem geworden, das 80nst ohumaohtise 
Nlchts bat elne g.wl.8. I»att erbalten, denn obne elne 801che 
konnte e. eina Verand.rung dar von Gott se.etzten Seinawelse der 
Kreatur nlcht el"lDogllohen.·' 
4.8Ibld.,p.5 
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~ould have used the nihil as a powerful principle tor the real con-
struction ot this wor14. 49 
One ot the reasons why Augustine so much stresses the creation 
out ot nothing is that he wants to distinguish himself tram those 
philsophers and haeretics who do not keep a clear distinction bet-
ween ~he procession ot the Son out ot the essenpe of the Father, 
and the creation'of the world. In De Natura Boni Augustine explici 
- -
11 J.getuses such haeJ.ges'150 and stJ.98SSeS the tact that he does not 
think ot a positiVe power when speaking about the nihil. He J.9idi-
cules those hael'etics, who undeJ.9stand the word ot Holy Sripture: 
"S1ne 1110 factum est nih1l", as 11' it said that the nihil was 
oreated and there1'ore must be something. 'These people, Augustine 
says, lost their minds because of their inclination to contJ.9adict. 
He points to some statements of Holl Scripture where it is clearll 
express.d that l'dhil does not mean 'something', as in st. Paul t s 
letter to the Romans (14, l7) a "Qui vcoat ea, quae non aunt, tan-
quam sint. ,.51 
49 With J.gegard to the role the nihil has in Augustine's con-
ception ot cl"eation and. the rinite wortd: of. Mausbach, I, p. 137. 
50De Batura' Boni, c. 27; PL. 42, 560: "Ex ipso autem non hoc 
signif1eat quod de-rpso., Q~odenim d$ ipso est, poteat dioi ex 
ipso} non aut •• omlle quod ex ipso est. 11'ect. dicitur de ipso. Ex 
ipso eni. ooelum et terra, quIa ipse tecit eaJ non autem de ipso, 
quia non de substantia sua. u 
51De Natura~, e. 25-26. lk- 42, 559sa. 
Having this historical position in mind, whioh was conditioned 
by haeretioal adversaries, it becomes absolutely certain that 
Augustine did not conoeive of the nihil as a second principle for 
the explanation ot a finite oreation and its oorruptibility. 
To explain the corruptibility an~ all change within natures, 
it was suffioient for Augustine to conceive God as the highest 
Being, the ult1ma substant1a, and ultima causa. This God was foI' 
,- . ~...;..;..;, .... 
him the 'I am', the onlr being that did not receive and possess 
his aot of existence, but who is ident1cal with his exi'stenoe and 
thel'e.fol"e oannot lose it nor change it. All other beings reoeived 
their act of existence .from God, and as they get it, so they can 
lose it. There oan be a change in them because they came Into 
e.xlstenee within time, and thus they are temporal, ohangeable 
beings. 
But the ohange from being to non-being, rrom the goad to the 
bad does not need a cause. Only the movement toward God, toward 
greater being and grsater goodness needs an efricient oause. It 
is Augustine's conoept ot evil as tabsentia ~ _d~e_b_l~t_it that pre-
vents him tl'om conceiving nothingness as a positive power.52 
520t. B1llie.leh, Das Problem des Ubels in del" PhilosoEhie des 
Abendlandes, (Wlen, 195$1; 7, p. ZSS;-note !4~ ~ere BI!lIosleh ---
quotes dIfferent modern c~ltlos 11ke Harnaok, Dorner, Helmsoeth, 
Ueberweg-G.yel',eto., who all tI'led to pI'ove that Augustine under-
stands the nihil as a poweI'tul prinoiple, whioh God has to use tor 
the oreation of a finite world, so ths.t Augustine had never overcom 
the Manich •• n dualism. fbis objectlon,how.ver, Augustine had re-jeoted already in his book _O_o_n_t_r_~ ~ullanwm. 
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w. will hlllve to oome baok to the que3tion about the role of 
nothingness in Augustine's explanation of evil when talking about 
moral evil and its 'deficient cause l • 
For Augustine the ol'igin of physical eV,11 li~s 1n the oreated .. 
ness ot finite beings. The;re is no real caus,. fol' physical evilJ 
neither is God the cause of it nol' is the nihil a powertul prin-
t , / 
ciple that would destroy tinite beings from within. Because they 
received their being, they oan lose it. And they lose it, because 
God wanted a world ot continuous ohange, in whioh one generation 
ot living beings after another has to vanish to be replaoed by a 
still new .one. 
It follows, therefore, 1matfor Augustine physical evil would 
have been a reality also in a world without sin. It belongs neces-
sarily to a finite oreat10n. If God wanted a temporal world of 
inanimate and animate bodily beings, He neoessarl1y had to admit 
the ooming 1nto being and dylng;ot these things, the fact that 
later beings w~ld replace the older ones and even tight against 
them, the gradual and partly painful decay ot subhuman 11fe.53 
53Bu.rton f s contention that Augustine oompletel., identified 
sin and evil and thereto~. was not able to aoknowledge the "neces-
sity of evil wherever 1s 11te", is absolutely unfounded. As in 
the quotation &0111 Contra, Secundlnum, XV: tf Caeterl autem defectus 
•••• mensurls r.~ Inflmaram Interven1unt, ut praeoedent1a suoce-
dent1bus c.dant •••• ", 1t 1s apparent that tor A~stlne a finite 
corporeal world .8088sar117 ineludes 'deteotus· (l.e. evils); only 
he Is not willing to accept this sort 01 'evIt· 1n the same sense 
as the evil of sin,. Augustine would not 4eny that 1n human life 
ignoraace and all sorts of difficulties could be natural and would 
have been present in a pure natural order. But for him these dif-
fioulties of lite would not have been really evils, tor they would 
46 
Refusing to admit any kind of re$i,l causality, especially- in 
God, for phys1cal evil as a falling away from being, Augustine 
however speaks of some kind of permission of God for the presence 
of evil. Nothing can happen in God's creation without His permit-
ting it. In Q!. Ordine Augustine has Monica express the comprehen-
sive words about evil in this world. These have to be applied to 
physical evil as well as to punishment and even to moroal evill 
" ••• non puto nihil potuiase pra.eter Dei ordinem fieri, 
quia ipsum malum quod natum est, nullo modo Dei ordi-
ne natum est} sed illa justitia Id inordinatum esse 
non slvlt'5~t in stb! merltum ordlnem redegit et 
compullt. 4 
God permitted this kind of evIl in the cosmos because He saw that 
the corruptible beings are in such a way that they only contribute 
to the order and the goodness of the universe, and that their 
passing away would not leave any- stain on the created beauty.55 
have g1ven man the task to overcome them and 30 would have been 
the peason for the beauty of heroio struggle in mankind. "Igno-
rantia vero at dlfflcultas s1 naturalis est, inde inde inoipit 
an1mam profioere, et ad oogn1tionem et requiem, donee in ea perfl-
ceretur vita beata, promover1." Cf. La Roy Burton, p. 186. 
54D8 Ordine, II, c. 7; PL. 32, 1005. 
- -55De Natura Bon1, o. 8, PL. 42, 554: " •.•• nee esse, quamv1s 
minora et mInIma bona .. nIsi asummo bono Deo potuerunt, !cdc ordlna .. 
tasunt, ut oedant Infirmiora tirm.iorlbus, at Invs11diora fortior!" 
bus, et Impotentiora potentiorImls, •••• Flt autem decedentibus at 
suecodentibus rebus temporalis qusedam 1n· suo genere pulchritudo, 
ut nee ipaa quae MG't"luntul", vel quod erant esse desinunt, turpent 
aut turbent modum at speciem et ordlnem universae creaturae: s10ut 
se~o bene aompositus utlque pulcher est, quamv1s in eo syllabae 
atque omnes soni tanq~ nasoendo at moriendo transaurrant." 
47 
Looking back at what we have achieved up to here, we must say 
that these philosophical considera.tlons fln Augustine offer a mere 
aesthetical solution of the problem of evil. In its metaphysical 
essence evil is privation or being and good; it has a purely nega-
tive character. Eaoh si~gle creature-bears the germ for its decay 
in itseli rrom its very beginning. But by decaying, by taIling 
away tZ'om being, the single creature doe.s not p,ollute or at'fect 
the beauty and goodness of the universe. On the contrary, it con-
tZ'ibutes to the goodness of the whole, by fitting in the order as 
God's wisdom has designed it. 
Yet this 1s not the whole solution Augustine offers with Z'e-
gard to physical evil in the anti-Manichean books. All physical 
evil that somaha",art.cts man Is at the same time consideZ'ed as 
punishment. On the following pages we have to try to understand 
Augustine's teaching on this point and its Z'elation to what we 
called the aesthetical solution. 
In his Dialogues, written in the first years after his con-
veZ'sion, Augustine follows very much the pagan Neoplatonic thought 
of Plotinus and so aZ'rives like this one more or less only at the 
aestheticsl solution. Very soon and with the progress of yeaZ's, 
howev:;r, he sees this world as one whose orig;inal order has been 
destroyed by the sin ot Adam. 
Viewing evil from this stsndpoint, Augustine not only differs 
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trom Plotlnus but is completely opposed to him. For in Plotinus 
there is no place tor a really free will in a creature. Lastly 
all origin of evil tor Plotinu8 lies in matter, in what has with-
drawn furthest from the tOne'. Sinee a oertain neeessity lies over 
the whole creation, the original order is never abolishfJd. Under 
the new aspect, however, the original order, whioh w~s a superna-
tural one, has been broken down and a new one had to be bu:ll t by 
the grace at God. So physical evil is not only the neoessary con-
sequenoe ot the finiteness at creatures, but is intimately connac-
ted with the sin of AdaD4 The disorder and plagues in this world, 
sicknessesand death. are then oonsidered as a privation ot a good, 
with which man once was gratuitously gifted or which even belonged 
to his nature: "vulneratus in natuzaalibus". --~------ -- ~--------~ 
As was stated above, even in a creation of a purely natural 
order there would have been physical evils. Then man would also 
bave been subjeoted to pains and sutferings. But these pains and 
sutferings would not have been an evil in the proper sense. Now, 
however, pains and sufferings are penalties for the sin of Adam 
and our own sin. In this sense Augustine contends that the evils 
are not natm.-al: "Eece autem omnia. qua.e teci.iti DellS, bona valdez 
mala vero non esse naturalia. 1t 
In the order in which man ~ !acto has been created, namely 
wi th supernatural grace and wi-t;h the vocation for eternal life, 
man was the lord of this world and all creatures obeyed his com-
mand. Through sin this hierarchy has been corrupted. The lower 
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natures no longer are obedient to the higher natures; the body and 
the flesh disobey the commands of the spirit. The animal world no 
longer respects man as its lord. This whole disorder is the effect 
of original sin Which makes all physioal evils, that affliot man 
a punishment.56 
Thus all the suffering of the innooent ereat~es gets its rea] 
meaning only, if it is seen within the order in whioh sin has such 
an important plaoe. In the Q! Libero Arbittl0, for example, Augus-
tine points out how God uses 'the Buftering of the ohildren to cor-
rect their parents. The suffering of the ohildren is without 
doubt an evil for the ohildren themselves as tor their parents. 
But God uses these physical evils to free the parents from the 
slave:ry ot sin a.nd save them tor eternal life. For the ohildren 
56ctr• ~. Manioh., 37J PL. 42, 203: nEt hinc maxima apparet 
quantttm~l~ribuerlt dignltatem, quod Deus qui salus tlbl natu-
rallter domlnatur, fecit alla bona qulbus tu ~oque dominaveris. 
Wec m1r.~is quod nunc tIb! non omn! modo serviunt et te ali quando 
etiam. cruciant: quia Dominus tuus majorem potestatem habet in aa 
quae tibi aerviunt quam tu in ipsa. tanquam in servos lervo:ru.m 
IUOrum. Quid ergo miram si tib1 peccanti !d est non obtemperantl 
Domino tuo, poenalia qu1bus dominaber1B, effecta Bunt? Hoe namque 
humane. natura 1n Adam meruit, de quo nuno non est dlsputandl locus: 
sed tamen dominator justus et justls praem11s et justis supp11cils 
approbatur, beatltate recte v1ventlum poenaque peocantlum. n 
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these evils soon will be as if they never had been, while for the 
parents they have eternal etfects,S7 
Physical evil as punishment has two meanings: it is medicine 
tor the sinner himself and it is a means used by God to maintain 
the order of the universe, as it is !! tacto. 
Some oritics, as among others K. Seipio, reproach Augustine 
of not having solved the p~Gblem of evil because, as 18 said, he 
overlooked what the suffering under physioal evils means for the 
suffering human be1ng, It 1s not enough, Scipio says58 to tell the 
J.urtering human being that hi3 pains and sorrows belong necessari-
ly to the beauty of the universe. But this criticism is not justi-
57B! Libero Arbitrio, III, o. 23; l&. 32, 1304. 
58K• Scipio, p. 106: "Das Ubel erweist Augustin als kosmischen 
Sohein, hervorgebraoht <lurch den beschrinkten endliohen Standpunkt 
des Besohauers. Er vergisst, dass tar das leidende Ioh das Ubel 
mebr ist als eine _sthetische !rUbung, well das lch mehr ist als 
ein seelenlosea Atom. Er ubersieht, daas del' Kosmos selbst ubal 
ist, welcher dem Leldenden kelnen andero Trost zu geban vermag als 
den: 'Ou le!dest eigentlioh gar nicht, dein Le!d ist,nur ein Man-
gel des NOl"Dlalzustandes .. t Geztade bier betindet sioh di. bedenk ... 
lichste stelle in Augustins System: tiber die Tier. des Leids und 
des'fioels, wie sehr er auch personlich otfenes Gemfit da~r hat. 
geht e~ In dar Erklirung zu obertliohlioh hinweg. Der ernstlioh 
leidenden P.ra~nllchkelt kann es uberall vollstandig einerle! sein, 
dass Ihr Leid antlthetiach der Gesamtsohonhelt der Welt zur Folie 
diene. Augustins Beaeitigung des Ubels 1st ein Tasohenspleler-
stueokohen, .in. Escamotage. NIoht mit isthetlschen (univeraellen) 
sondern mit zteliglosem (1ndivlduellen) OptimisMUa hitte er allein 
den Pesslm.1am.us f1berwinden konnan. rt 
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fied. While Augustine does say that the most important factor is 
that the order of the universe is maintained, or,if it is disturbed 
that it is repaired by the suffering of those who are the cause of 
the disturbance, he also maintains that it is better for sinners 
themselves to sutfer punishment for their sins, so that they might 
be healed ~om the corruption, Which sia has etfected in them. 
Explicitly Augustine says that all punishment, whioh we reoeive on 
earth, 1s medicine to cure man: "Quldquid dlvlnltus ante i11ud u1-
tlmum. ludlclum vindleatur, ad medlcinamvalere credendum est."59 
In this sense even for the single person punishment is not an evil 
strictly speaking because. as Augustine says, sin without punish-
ment Is worse than the suftering of punishment. For sin is the 
real evil and punishment is only the means to cure man trom the 
evil ot 91n. 60 
Besides being medicine, punishment is u>$ed by God to maintain 
the order of the universe, whlch has been destroyed by sin. God 
has a fixed plan of the world, 1n which everything has its p1aoe. 
If now man refuses to aecomodate himself to this plan then puniSh-
59 4 ~. !2- Manloh •• c. 1,~. 2, 113. 
60De NatUl'a Bon1, c. 20; PL. 42, 557: "Sunt autem mala slne 
dolor. pejora, pelus est enim gaudere de 1niqu1tate, quam dolere 
de corruptiona: verumtamen etlam tale g.udlum non poteat esse nisi 
ex adaptione bonorum interiorum, sed in1quitas est desertl0 meli-
orum. Item in corpore .elius est vulnus oum dolore, quam putredo 
sine dolora, quae special1ter oorruptl0 d1oitur.!t 
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ment has to replaoe what by his own the sinner does nat fulfill: 
t'slout anim qui non vigilat_ dormitJ sio quisquis non 
tacit, quod debet, sine intorvallo patitur quod de-
bet, quoniam tanta est beatitudo justitia~1 ut nama 
ab oa nisi ad miseriam possit abscedere."b~ 
God's planning and acting is alw8Y8 directed toward the uni-
versal good, whioh 1s at the same time the good ot the individual. 
It depends on the tree creature it it aocomodates itself to God's 
intentions. In case the oreature leaves the order and puts itself 
in opposition to the divine will, this very divine will and acting, 
whioh remains intending the good and happiness for the creature, 
must appear in the torm of revenging justioe. The divine order, 
against which the creature fights, turns itself against the sinner. 
"Quibus bonis omnibus qui male utI voluerit, divino judioio poenas 
luet.,,62 
From what haa been said it beoomes clear that Augustine re-
gards punishment as something good. It is good, because it is a 
means tor God to maintain the beauty and goodness of the universe, 
which is an image ot God. It is good beoause it proceeds from 
divine justioe, and everything that is just is also good: 
nIta ergo Deus malum (poenae) tacit, quod non ipsi 
61D& libero Arbitrio, III, 15; PL. 32, 1293. 
_. -
62Q!. Natura!2!!!, c. 13 J ~. 42, 555. 
Deo malum est, sed eis, in quod vlndicat. Itaque 
ipse, quantum ad sa pertinet, bonum facit, quia o~e justum bonum est, et justa est Ills. vindicatio," 03 
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And punishment is good In a oertain way even for the punished per-
son, because it helps him to reach his final s,pernatural goal. 
Because of this goodness of punishment Augu:ltine does not hesitate 
to attribute punishment positively to God: "Pecoatum ad Deum non 
pertinet, poena peooati ad vindioem pertinet. n64 
We have to ask now if the taot of physioal evil being punish-
ment is another reason why physical evil is not an evil in the 
strict sense. In a certain way Augustine oertainly wants it to be 
understood so. 
Aa we have stressed so much before, Augustine views the single 
events and tacts alwars from the point of vIe. ot the total order, 
whioh represents Godts wisdom in this world. Thus now, beoause 
physioal evil is used by God as punishment, it contri.;,utes to the 
goodness ot the universe in a special way. It helps to oure the 
sinful human beings so that the,. might fit into the universal order 
and reach their tinal goal, and it is a kind of reparation for the 
injury done to divine justioe. 
However, there 1s a certain break between the oonsideration 
or phYSical evil aa neoessary oonsequenoe of a finite creation and 
63~. Adimant., o. 26; ~. 42, 169. 
64D1sp• !!!_ Fortunat., 15; ~. 42, 118 
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physical evil as punishment. While the first ki~d of consideration 
is appllable to a pure natural order, the seoond kind presupposes 
a supernatural order in whioh man is destined for eternal life in 
union with God. Augustine himself, however, does not know a clear 
out distinction between a pure natural order and the supernatural 
. ~ 
ordel', That's why in his writings these two points of view are 
found aide by side. 
e. Oonclusion 
Lookina back at our whole consideration about physical evil, 
we oome to the conolusion that for Augustine physioal evil can be 
only an evil in a very improper senae. We saw every being, in so 
far aa it participates in being, to be goodJ for to be means to be 
good. Under this aspect there is no plaoe for evil: evil is 
nothing. That, however, does not mean that Augustine flatly denie 
the roeal presence or physical evil in this world. What he wants t 
deny is only that evil in its metaphysioal essenoe is not a sub-
stantial principle, cont*ibutlng positively to the existenoe of 
this world. As it is a necessary consequence of the oreation out 
of nothing, 80 in itself it is nothing else than a tendenoy ot the 
oreature toward nothingness in oorruption and deoay. As suoh 
physioal evil 1s not a stain on God's oreation; muoh more, it unde 
lines the beauty and the goodness of the universe. Finally physios 
evil gets a new meaning and importanoe by being punishment, 80 
being a means in God's hands for restoring the order of justioe 
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~ medicine against the only real evil--sin. 
CHAPTER III 
MORAL l!.V!L 
A. Introduotion: Physioal Order and Moral Order 
Enoompassed by the Eternal Law 
To turn fvom the physical order of evil to the moral order 
does not mean in Augustinian ph1lo8oplq' to start from the very 
beginning with an absolutely new subjeot. There is no complete 
oleavage between these two spheres. 
Both orders, the physioal and the moral, are enoompassed by 
the one eternal law. This eternal law determiues the well ordered 
events and the development of the inanimate and animate subhuman 
natures. It also orders men so that 1n freely living according 
this eternal law they beoome just and united with God. "Nos vera 
...... secundum aeternam legem, qua natura11s erda servatu.r. juste 
Vivimus. ttl This eternal law 1s identioal with God's essence" or 
better: with God's wisdom and His will: "Lex aeterna est ratio di-
vina vel voluntas Dei ord1nem naturalem oonserva.r1 iubens et per-
turbarl vetans."2 
Beoause this eternal law 1s identioal with God's essenoe, 
letr. Faustum, XXII. 27; PL. 42, 419 
- -
2Ibid.; PL. 42,. 418 
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Augustine can say that (rod 1s the last principle of all moral good. 
Everything that 1s good 1s good only through Him in the same way as 
everything that exists has its being only through Him. 
Having this in mind; we will attempt to elaborate Augustine's 
answer to the two questions: 1) What is the nature of moral evil? 
and 2) What is the oriein and cause ~t moral evilt 
B. The Nature of Moral Evil 
a.Negative answer 
In the t,1'UIWer to the flUe stion about the ns. tuz-e of moz-al evil, 
Augustine stresses the negative character of moral evil just as he 
does 1n regard to physioal evil. 
The Manioheans oontended that moral evil prooeeds from an evil 
substance 1n man tending toward an evil objeot. Against them Augus 
tine defends the position that an evil action does not prove the 
existenoe ot an evil substance either in the one do1ng wrong or 
1n the objeot sought. The oreatures to which man turns in his 
immoral aotlon are good in themselves.) What is wrong is his in-
oz-dinate attaohment to them. Man was oalled by God to use the 
creatures as means to z-each his final goal, God himself. In acting 
thus man beoomes the tree and dominating lord of all creatures. In 
JDe Natura Boni, c. 34; PL. 42, 562: "Item quia paooatum vel 
iniqultas non I's~petitio na~urartun mal.rum, sed desertio meli-
orumJ sic in Soripturis invenitur soriptum, Omnia oreatura Dei 
bona est (1 Tim., IV, 4)." 
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immoral actIon, however, man makes himself the slave of the lower 
creatures by making them. the final end of all his wishes, seeking 
in them all his happiness: 
IlQuae quanquam in ordine suo recte locata sint, at surun 
quamdam pulchritudlnem per8gent; perversi taman aaimi 
est et inordinatl, eis sequendis subjicI, quibus ad 
nutum ducpndis potius divino ordlne ao jure praela-
tus est. "4 . 
Thus the object of sin is in itself good and therefore even in 
immoral action man is striving for an image ot God. It, however, 
the object is good, it is neither necessary nor possible to con-
ceive of the one acting immorally as an evil substance. Even an 
immoral act, in 30 tar as it has an accidental baing, is good. 
Thus Augustine can say that in the act ot sinning man is trying to 
imitate God, only he does it in a wrong way: 
"Ita fornicatur anima, cum avertitul' abs te, at quaerit 
extra 'be quae pura et liquida non inventt nisi Cllm 
reddit ad te, Perverse te imitanturomnes qui longe 
se a te t.eiunt, .t exto11unt se adver~ te. Sed 
etiam sic~te im1tando indicant creatol'em te esse omnia 
naturae. ";1 
b. Positive answer 
Sinee neither the object nor the subject nor the act or tUl'~ 
toward the creatures as sueh makes an aet sinful. the only evil 
~~ L1bel'o Arb1trio, I, 16, ~. 32, 1240. 
5conf., II, c. 6; PL. 32, 681. 
~Ctl'. Seound. linieh., c.10, ~.42, 587. 
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in an immo~al $otion lies in the turning away from God, in the in-
ordinate use of' and the inordinate tending toward the crfiatures: 
"Non est e~goJ ut dixi, peocatum mala. naturae appet1tio, 
sed melioris desertio; et ideo factum ipsum maTuro est, 
non ilIa nat~a qua male utltur peeeans, Malum est 
enim male uti bono."b 
Augustine describes this turning away from God as a falling away 
from the highegt being and greatest good, and thus a fallir~ away 
f~om the set order, which flows from and reflects the essence of 
the highest being. This falling away .from. God corresponds to What 
Augustine describes in the subhuman creatures a.s the tending toward 
nothingness, the1~ decay, by which these creatures lose pa.rt of 
that goodness which they should have. Therefo~e immo~al action 1s 
pure deficiency. It 1s something negative, even privative. 
Primarily Augustine sees in moral evil this absence o.f the 
right direction of our action. But besides that, secondarily, htl 
desoribes moral evil as a privation of goodness in the 8Gul of the 
immorally aoting per30n. As physioal siokness 1s not the substanoe 
of the body, but the privatIon of the health and completeness of 
the body, so moral evil, sin, 1s not·'.;the substanoe of the soul, but 
the privation of goodness and the com.pleteness of tholoul. 
In book III, chapter 65 and the to~lowing of the Q! Lib< ro 
6De Nattwa Boni, c. 36J PL. 42, 562. 
C!'f. 15e trbir'O""'ArbItrI0,-r, 16, PL. 32, 12401 tt .... assentior, 
omnIa pecciia lioc uno genera contlnerr, cum quIque avertitur a di-
vln1s vereque manentibus, at ad mutabl1ia et Incerta convertltur. tt 
J 
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Aruitrio Augustine treats !!. proteaso the lessening ()f good in Q 
soul aoting immorally. There he contends that the soul, though 
losing of sonte goodness, is not z-obbed of 8.11 its goodness. This 
soul, though stained with sins, is on a tar hi~~er lev~l of gOOd-
ness than th<t goodness in lower l:l.atw~s. The ability to sin im-
plies that basic goodness that is inherent in the faculties ot 
intelleot and will. Man with these faoulties has greater metaphy-
sioal goodness even when he aots immorally than other creatures 
have which do not possess intelleot and will, 
lISiout enim m.elior est vel aber_"'ans equus, quam lapi s 
propterea non aberrans, quia pz-oprio motu et sensu 
oaz-et, ita est exoell~ntlor oreatuz-a quae libel'a vo-
luntate peocat, quam quae propterea non peocat quia 
non haberet llbaram voluntatem." (nr. 15) 
Thez-afore God must be praised even in people aoting immorally. Thi 
is not because the,. sin, but beeause they alwaY8 keep the t~oodness 
ot a Spil-i tual being, a.nd thi s 113 a higher form. ot an image of 
God himself. 7 Aeaorditlg to Augustine the essential Goodness of 
man which he possesses espeoially in his fz-ee will is never lost 
by aoting immorally. The subhuman goods always remain far below 
man' 51 goodness. 
7Ds Libera Arbittl0, III, 5, PL. 32, 1279: ffaur ergo non lau-
detur neue, 'et inellablIi praedieatione laudetur qui oum feoertt 
ess quae in legibus assent justitiae permansarae, feoit etiam ani-
mas, quas vel peeoatuz-as vel in peooat1s etiam p .. :rseveItaturas esse 
pItaev1debat: oum et tales adhuo mel10res sunt eis quae quoniam 
nulllnn habent rationale ao liberum voluntatis arbitrlum paeeaIte 
non possint?tt 
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The tact that Augustine considers every existent as good and 
determine. evil as the loss of good, could lead one to the con-
clusion that he thinks ot immoral aotion as corruption ot the sub-
stantial being ot the subjeot. 8 Yet he otten repeats that a high 
nature, although corrupted, still remains better than a lower 
nature, although not corrupt.. 'rhus Augustine polnts out that the 
dltterenoe between the good and bad angels lle. not in having a 
4ifterent nature, but In the sin of the bad angels and the cleavi 
to God of the good angels. "The creat~e, therefore, Whioh oleave 
to God, difters trom those who do not, not by their nature but by 
their aoting which is immoral; and yet even in this very immoral 
acting the nature itself is shown to be very noble and admirable.9 
What Augustine means by the diminutlon ot being through Im-
moral action Is that man loses the partioipation 1n God.s being. 
Aooording to Augustine man and angel were gifted with supernatural 
8Trepta interprets Augustlne in that way_ He wr1tes (Pj 99.) 
nEs liegt hie:r der Gedanke vor, dass je mew das mora11sohe Ubel 
die harmonische Selnsweiae 4er von Ihm beharteten Substanz aufhebt 
es um so mehr auch die Realitit de:r letzteren verzehrt und damlt 
zuglelcb •• ine e1geue Existens untergrabt. Denn, wie wlr sehan, 
kann das Bose, als 8in Nlohtsubstantlelles, nu:r an elnem Realen 1n 
die Wirklichkelt treten. So 1st das ganze St:reben des bose ge.o%'-
denen Realen gleichsam e1n selbatmorderlsohes, el st:rebt naoh 
~.ln.r eigenen Vernlchtung. Doeh lal8t August1n, um dle stet. 
Uberlegenbe1t des von Gott gesehaftenan aealen uber das widergott-
I1oh. Blohts restzuhalt.n, das Bo •• aeln Z1.1 nle ganz e:rre1ohen, 
sond.rn slch ihm hoohstens nihern (nihl1o appropinquare).M 
9Q! Clvltate B!!, XXII, 1, ~. 41, 751-52 
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11te trom the flrst moment of their existenoe, and with the power 
of thls life they we~e direoted toward God, the hlghest truth and 
the absolute belng. It 1s preo1sely this standing betore God that 
established the greatness of angel and man. Related by spec1al 
gift to God, they partake in His being and have 1n Him a higher 
degree of being. ~ey were llfted up above their created and na-
tural degree of being. But falling away from thehl6hest being, 
the ~ essentla, angels and men are now on a level of belng 
lower than they had been betore and lower than they should be. 
Losing the intlmate conneotion with God that was theirs, the talla 
angels and men kept only the1r finite nature. Yet th1s nature w& .• 
wholly or1ented toward the supernatural 11te. 
Thus s1n not only d1sturbs the supernatural g1tts 1n man, but 
it cor~pt. that natural perfeotion ot man which 1s constituted by 
its corresponding measure, form and order. Meaaure, torm and ora 
reach 1n man the highest degree possible in thls visible world, 
Decause in man they contain the ethical element ot the relation 
ot the rational nature to God. 
The measure of the soul consists ln wisdom. By this the soul 
avoids the devlation into the 'too mucb t and ttoo little t • This 
wisdom aa measure of the soul save. man t~om diving lnto the lusts 
~t flesh 07 po.e~. and fpc. separatlng himself trom all the world, 
living egot1sttcally for himself. 10 
10Q! Libera Arbltrio, II, 9-16; PL. 32, 12$7 ss. 
The natural form or beauty of the soul Is the '~eotltudo 
voluntatis' or the 'Yeritas t • Man has his oapacity for this actu-
ated by grace. ll Now, after having turned away from God, man lost 
this grace and with It the ability to direct his will easily towa 
its only and highest good. Through the aversion from God man 
sinks into vanity and darkness of spirit. 12 
3in thus corrupts the order within and without. For o~der 
says: subordination of the body to the soul and of the soul to God 
But through sin man puts created goods higher than God. By per-
verting this most fundamental order, the order within man falls 
apart. The body no longer is obedient to the spirit but revolts 
against it. So the tendency toward nothingness which is the cha-
racteristic of sin exists In both the loss of grace and the disor-
der of natupe.13 
Concluding we must say that for Augustine the charaoteristic 
trait ot moral evil - as we have seen it also for physical evil-
is the tendency toward nothingness. He refuses to admit that.im-
moral action prosapposes an evil substance or that suoh immoral 
11ctr.~. Manioh., c. 16-18; 1&- 42, 184 ss. 
12»0 Gen. etr. Manich., II, 16; PL. 34, 208: "Partioeps veri-
tatis pot.st esse-anIma humana, ipsa autem veritas Deus est immu-
tabilis supra 111am. Ab ea ye~o verltate quiquls aversus est et 
ad seipsum conversus tenebratur mendacio." 
13De .Mor. Manieh. t c. 6; PL. 32. 1348: " ..... Nlhil est autero 
esse, quam-uEum .ss ••••• Quare-ordinatio 8SS8 cog1t, 1nordinat10 
vero non esse." 
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aotlon has itself any kind of sUDstautlal evil being. Primarlly 
immoral action is the wrong directedness of the will, its aversion 
trom God and its Inordlnate conversion to the oreatures. Seoon-
darily immoral aotion is the loss of goodness, loss of supernatura 
lif. with its nearness to God. This loss then effects the loss of 
natural goodness of the human being. 
o. The Origin of Moral Evil 
There arises the questlon now: whenoe oomes this talling away 
from God? ~~ere is the origin, what Is the cause at it? First of 
all it 18 apparent, Augustine answers, that God oannot be the OEms 
of it, sinoe it is a movlng toward nothingness like oorruptlon in 
the phy.ioal sphere. God oannot at the same time be the cause for 
be1ng and non.being. 
Always having this viewpoint in mind. Augustine endeavers to 
find an ana •• r which does not imply that ultimately God is the 
cause ot sin 1n any wa1. Because ot this, tne doctrine of the 
Manicheans that the flesh 1s responsible for all moral evil is 
unaoceptable. In their dualistio conoeption there exist two huma 
beings, the one born out ot voluptuous desires, godless and know-
ing only the sinful desires of the flesh, the other born out of th 
spirit, similar to God and full of God's life. For Augustine, 
however, the total man with bod)' and soul has been created by God. 
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Therefore man 1s good 1n his totality.14 We must love not only 
our soul, but a130 our body, since God gave it to us that it might 
help us with all its faculties to reaoh our final goal. "Sic uti ... 
que dilig1t carnem suam, quam sibi ad obedientiam legitime subdit 
atque ordinat. H15 h'verybcx1y who deolares the bod,. with 
as the oause of sin, aoouses God and makes Him the last cause of 
all moral evil. 16 The evils of the flesh, then, with its disorde 
conoupiscence are due to original sin and are not originated by th 
body as such., These evils are the result, not the cause of s:.n. 17 
So we have seen that the negative answer on the question 
about the origin o£ moral evil is very clearly given by Augustine: 
neither God nor the flesh 1s the cause of moral evil. There tore 
the oause for all sin .. in so tar as there 1s a cause at a11-
140tr. Fauatum. XXIV, 2; PL. ~2, 475: "Non itaque unum homine 
tecit a~magInem suam, at alte-ram tecit non ad imaginem auam: sed 
quia hoo utrumque interlus .t exter1us simul unus homo est, huno 
unum hominem ad imaginem sua. teclt ••• " 
15~bid., XXI, 51 ~. 42, 391 
l6De 01vltate Dei, XIV, 5J PL. 41, 408: "Non igitur opus est 
in peccitls vItfI.qU;-nost~is ad-Creatoris injur1am oarnis aocusar 
naturam, quae 1n genere atque ordIne suo bona est." 
17Io1d., XIV, 3; PL. 41, 406: tfNam oorrupt10 oorporls quae 
aggravata'iiimam, non peccatl priml est causa sed poena; nee oaro 
eorruptlb1118 anlmam eeooatrioem, sed anlma peooatrlx fe01t esse 
oorruptibl1em carnem. " •••• Vel'Ullltamen qui omnIa animae mala ex 
corpore putant aooidls •• , in errore sunt." 
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can be sought in tree will alone. Thus Augustine somehow identi-
ties the questlon about moral evil with the question about tree 
w1l1: 
"Quae tandem esse poterit ante voluntatem oausae volun-
tatis malae? Aut enim et ip~a voluntas est, et a 
padioe ipsa voluntatis non raoedit: aut non est volun-
tas, at peceatum nullum habet," Aut igitur voluntas 
est prima causa peooandi, aut mal,xm pe~catum est causa 
peoeandi: nee est, cui recte imputetur peocatum nisi 
pecean,i. Non ergo est, cui recte imputetur nisi 
volentl."18 
b. Positive answer 
Now we have to tind o~t how Augustine explains the taot that 
the free will created by the good God turns away trom God toward 
1.$8 goods. How does tpee will get its movement toward nothing-
ness? 
Augustine is abaolutely certain that we really have a free 
wl11, that we choose in tree ohoice what to do and what not to do: 
"Non eni. quldEluam tam firm. et Intlme aentio, quam 
me habere voluntate. eaque me moverl ad aliquid fru-
endum, quld autem meum dicam prorsus non inv6nio, 
ai voluntaa qua volo at nolo non est mea, quaprppter 
oui tribuendum est, al quld per 111am male racio, 
nisi m1h1?"19 
18De Libero Arb1t*10. III. 17, PL. 32, 1295. 
-.... . ....... 
19Ibid., III, 1, PL.32, 1272. 
Thi't'iet that Augustine never doubted the full f~"'>eedom ot wil 
even at the time when he had to stt-ess the importanoe or graoe in 
the fight against the Pelagians, can be shown with his own worda 
in the Retractationea and the De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio: 
Retraotatlonea, I, o. 9, 3; PL:-32 , $95:-wQUapropter novi haeretio 
PelagIan!, quI liberum sio asserunt voluntatia arbitrium, ut gra-
tia. Dei non t-ellnquant lOGtm, quandoquldeM eam seoundum merita 
nostra dar! asserunt, non se extollant, quaai eorum agerim causam, 
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Influenoes from outside or from our own feeling and imagination do 
not exclude .freedom of choiee. As bodl1y beings we are dependent 
on these influenees. But freedom of ch6ice only says that we have 
the power to rejeet or to accept objects whioh offer themselves to 
our eyes or inner imagination. 20 
Free will however as such does not in~lude sinfulness or not 
even the possibillty to sin. For if it did so, we would have to 
say that God has no free wl11, while In reality God is the most 
free being although He oannot sin. This peou11arity Augustine 
finds 1n the fact that the human free will has been oreated out of 
nothing. August1ne here compares the human 11'111 with all the ot 
oreated beings. As they corrupt because they are created out of 
quia in his librls d1x1 pro 11bero arbltrio, quae il11us dlsputa-
t1on1s causa posoebat." 
De Gratia at LIbera Arbitrio, 1; PL. 44, 881: "Propter eos qui 
htmInls liberum arbitrlum s10 praiaicant at defendunt, ut Dei gra-
tiam qua vooamur ad eum at a nostr1a malis meritis liberamur, et 
per quam bona taeroltls comparamus quibu8 ad vitam parven1amus aeter 
nam, negar. Budeant et oonentur auferre, multa lam disserulmus ••• 
Sed quoniam Bunt quldam, qui sic grat!am Del derendunt, ut negent 
liberum arbltrium; aut quando gratia detenditur, negari existlment 
liberum al'bltrlum, hlno aliqu!d soribere ••• curav!." 
20De Libero Arbitrio, III, 25; PL. 32, 1307: "Quid autem quia 
que velsumat vel respuat est in potestate, sed quo viso tangatur 
nulla poteltas est: tatendum est at eX'superlor1bus at ex intel'l-
oribus viais animum tang1 ut ratlonalis substantia ex utroque suma 
quod vo1uel'itJ .t ex merito sumen41 vel miseria vel beatitudo aub-
s.quatur. n 
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nothing, 30 it is this very oreation out of nothing that gives the 
free will its direction ot aversion from the highest being toward 
lower beings. 
"Motus ergo i1le QVersionis, quod fatemll.r esse pecca-
tum, quoniam defectivu9 motus est, omn1s autem defec-
tus ex nihilo est, vide quo pertineret, et ad Deum 
non pertinere ne dubltes."21 . 
However, a certain neoessity seems to be implied in Augustin~1 
statement, as Evodius expresses this difficulty: "Quia s1 1ta est 
data, ut naturalem habeat 1stum motum, jam necessitate ad haec con-
vertlturJ neque ulla culpa deprehendi potest, ub1 natura necessita· 
dominatur. rt22 
Against this object10n Augustine answers that there is an 
essential difference beside the similarity: While the stone neces-
sarily falls and the finite body neoessar11y corrupts - the move-
ment or the soul 1s willed and rree. 23 Thus the spirit 1s tree to 
21~ Libero Arbitrio, II, 20; ~. 32, 1270. 
22Ibid., III, 1; !&_ 32, 1270. 
23Ibid., III, 1; PL. 32, 1271: "Qui motus 131 culpae deputatur 
(unde qur-dubltat, 1rr!sione dignus tibi visus est), non est uti-
que naturalis, sed voluntarlusJ in eoque simi11. est ill1 motui 
quo deorsum versus lapis tertur, quod sicut iate proprius est lapi 
dis sic 11le anim1: verumtamen in eo dlssimilis, quod in potestate 
non habet lapis cohibere JIlotum quo tertur interius, animus v(~ro 
dum non vult, non Ita movetur, ut superiorlbus desertis inferiora 
deligatj at ideo lapidi naturalis est ille motus, animo vero ille 
yoluntarlus." 
sin or not to sin. From the faot of being oreated results for 
him only the ;eoss1bl1it:y: to sin. For the irrational oreature, how-
ever, the necesaitz of decay end of all sorts of physioal evils 
follow from the fact of being created out of nothing. 
Vi.wing the whole realm of being, Au~ustine locates within 
this realm the ~osition of the free will which can sin. This wIll 
Is a g-ood in betw.en the highest and the lowest S?od: The subhuman 
creatures cannot commit immoral acts, although created out of 
nothing, because they have no rational nature, God cannot commit 
an immoral act,. although He is a rati9nal nature with frae will, 
beoause He is the absolute -being, unable to fall a.way from Himself. 
Only angel and man can camni t immoral aots, because they have a 
rational nature and are created out of nothing. 
Thus .e have seen that for Augustine being oreated out of 
noth:ng and having free will are tho two presuppositions for the 
possloility of moral evil.~ But they do not give the oaUse of 
moral evil. In other words, the free will::itselt suoh as it has 
been created Oy God, is not the CGuse of sin. To understand this 
answer. we have. to have a aloser look at what Augustine thinks 
about the good will. 
As in his theory of knowledge, so also here in his teaohing 
24ne Libero Arbltrlo, II, 20; PL. 32, 1270: "Matus ergo i11e 
aver.ionIs quod tatemur 85$8 peacatum, quoniam defectivus MotUS 
est, omnis autem deteotu8 ex nihl10 est, vide quo pertlneret, et 
ad Deus non pertinere ne dubites. Qui tamen defectus quonlam est 
Yoluntarius, in nostra est positus poteatate." 
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on freedom or will, Augustine stresses the total dependency of man 
in his aotivity on the cooperation of God. Man can only do what 
God gives him. the strength to do. "Da quod jubes at jUbe quod 
vis.,,25 
Thereroro the power of #ree wil~; aocording to Augustine, 
cannot be .. H'feoti ve without the in:fluenee of God. He has to give 
divine concourse in so tar as the act of choice has existence, 
which onl1 God can give. God has to· give his gl'ace so that man 
oan ohoose and do the good, beoause by ohoosing and doing some thins 
goodman draws n.a~el' to God; he acquires new goodness. And this 
acquIring of .. higher degree of goodness and being oan only be don. 
by the grace or God. 
Accordingl1, for Augustine man oannot perform any good act 
withoUt the divine help.26 Even the virtuous aots of the pagans 
can only be done it God gives them His g1'80e. However, this graoe 
is different from the sanctifying grace of the ohildren of God, 
by whioh they become able to perform meritorious aots for eternal 
life. 
Generally speaking one may say that without the qoncursus 
sratlae man is too weak to tend towaras the highest being and therE-
250r. Contessionef!.' X. 29; .!!!. 32, 796: It •••• lmperas nobis 
continentiam. Ei oum soirem; ait quidam, quia nemo poteat esse con .. 
tinens nisl Deus det: et hoo Ipsum .rat saplentia. soire cujus 
asset donum.(3ap., VIII, 21)" 
26De Libera Arb1trio, rI, 20; PL. 32, 1210: "Sed quonlam non 
sicut homo sponte 0801d1t, ita etiamsponte surgere potest ••• !! 
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fore in this case falls into disorder striving only for the goods 
of this world. This sounds, however, as if duing good comes only 
from the power of graoe and that the will by itself oan only do 
eVil. That is, however not what Augustine teaches. The good and 
virtuous deed is not partly the effect of the will and partly the 
effect of graoe, but it is at the same time totally the effect of 
the grace and the w111. God always offers enough grace to the w111 
to turn toward the good. And the w111 always remains free to ac-
cept the grace and to aot with it or to reject it. When God en-
ables the will to will, and when He bestows on it the assistanoe 
it needs to do what He orders, it is still the will which wills and 
does what He orders, The free will to do what God gave man the 
power to do always remains untouohed. 
Having in mind this complete dependence of the good free will 
on grace and the unity of the good will with graoe, we can under-
.tand why Augustlne rejects the idea that this good free wl11 is 
the cause of m.oral evll. I.f this good fl'e8 wl11, such as it is, 
act., the effect neoessarily must be good. 
So w. have seen that for Augustine the good will is not the 
cause of immoral aotion. Therefore there rem.ains only the evil 
will ss the cause of all evil: 
" ••• radicem omnium malorum esse avarltlam (1 Tim., 
VI, 10), hoo eat, plus velle quam Bat est. Tantum 
autem sat e.t,quantua sibi exigit naturae In suo 
genera conaervand.e modus ••• Sed avaritla in omni-
bus rebus quae immoderate cupiuntur lntelllgenda 
est, ubicumqueomnino plus vult qui.que quam sat est. 
Haeo autem ayarltia oupidltaa est: oupiditas porro 
lmproba voluntas e!!lt. ErGO imEroba voluntas, malorum 
omnium. causa est. "27 
-
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Thus "evil will is the efficient cause of the evil action",28 and 
the nature ot this evil will Augustine determines as avarice. By 
avarice, however, he does not only mean the immoderate desire tor 
money. Avarice is understood in a broader sense as cupidity, the 
want tor more than 1s sufficient. By this excessive wanting man 
leaves the order into which he is placed. 
It is in this sense that Augustine must be understood when in 
another place he oalls 'pride' the beginning of all sins. In pride 
man looks at himself and his own greatness ln a disorderly way. 
The real greatness ot man lies in the recognition and subordination 
of himselt to God. The proud man sees this subordination as an 
unjustified limitation ot his own personality. He wants an abso-
lute greatness, as it belongs only to God. Wanting more than is 
sufficient and proper to him. the proud man incurs disorder and is 
thus directed toward nothingness. 
Here arises a diffioulty: On the one hand Augustine declares 
cup1dity in the widest sense as the cause ot all moral evil. On 
the other hand he rejects concuplscence as the cause of ev11, as 
we have seen earlier. There we saw that Augustine looks upon the 
27De Libero Arb1trio, III, 17; PL. 32, 1294. 
Cf. Risputa¥!o m. Fortunat. -;-21; ~. 42, 123 
l8De Civitate Del, XII, 6; PL. 41, 353: " ••• mala voluntas 
effloleni est operls mall. male iUtem yoluntatls .tfielens est 
nlhll." 
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disorderly desire of the flesh not as cause but as the effect of 
sin, namely of the sin of Adam. One is inclined to ask: is con-
cupiscence not one kind of oupidity, namely cupidity in the sphere 
of the flesh? For Augustine it is not, and therefore the contra-
diction between the two statel"1ents is only an apparent one. When 
speaking of conoupiscenoe, Augustine understands by it the flesh-
ly desires which are present and active without or even against 0 
will. Therefore, sinoe the cause of immoral action can be only in 
the will, ooncupiscenoe is not the cause of immoral action. When, 
however, speaking of cupidity, Augustine understands by it an ao-
tivity of the will, as can be seen in the quotation above: "cupi-
ditas porro improba voluntas est." The will may have been tempted 
by an irrational longing. But this irrational longing is not the 
oause ot sin. The cause is in the disorderly acting will itself. 
We have seen now, what Augustine determines as the cause of 
all immoral actions: the evil will, 'voluntas improba'. But with 
a oertain necessity a i'urther question Is raised ['or us: what 
causes the will to become evil, what makes him turn away ['rom. God,? 
To this question Augustine answers: ttl do not know. For that whie 
is nothing oannot be known. "29 
To understand what Augustine means in saying that sin is a 
'matus dereotlvus' whiah has only a 'oausa dettaiens', it is use-
ful to look at a text in the ~e Civitate Dei, in whiah he more 
- -
29De Libero Arbitrio, II, 20; ~. 32, 1269. 
14 
otten uses this expression. There he wrItes: 
If the further questIon be asked, what i8 tha eftloient 
cause ot evIl, none is found. It is the will itself 
which makes the aotion evIl, but .~at Is it that makes 
the will evil? And thus evIl wIll Is the efficIent cause 
of the evIl action, but of the evIl will there Is no 
3uoh cause ••• Let no one, therefore, look for the et-
flclent cause of the evil will; for It Is not efficient 
but deticient: thIs wIll is not" productive of an effect 
but it is a detect. DefectIon from that whioh supreme-
ly Is, to that which is in a less4egree, this is the 
beginning ot an evil wIll. But to .eek to discover 
the cause of these defectlons--causes as I have said, 
not efficIent, but .eficient,--is tantamgunt to endea-
voring to see darkness or hear silenoe."JO 
In order to understand oorreotly Augustinets dootrine, we have to 
distinguish between the formal and material aspeot of moral avil, 
as we have done it in regard to physical evil. 
The formal aspect gives the essential nature of evIl, shows 
moral evIl as pure negativity, as the absence of the .ell directed 
activity ot the will towards God. This absence in reality is a 
detective movement, Is a falling away trom God, the highest being, 
towards the lower beings. In this taIling away, Augustine says, 
the wIll 18 not effioient, but defioient, it i8 lackIng a reality 
that should be there. Sinoe this privation as 8uch Is not a real 
something, It cannot be known; tor it has no corresponding divine 
idea. This, however, does not mean that evil does not exist. Pri-
vat1on, although not a real existent, deSignates something, a state 
of affairs that 1s verJ real. This realIty Is the materIal aspect 
30De 01vltate B!!, XII, 6 ss.; ~. 41, 353 SSt 
75 
ot ev11. In physioal evil it was the cor~pted oreature. he~e It 
1s the evl1 corrupted wl11 which ls stl11 powertul enough to oom-
mit crlmea and all klnde ot Immoral actlons. 31 
Augustlne does not at all denJ the posltlve po.er whlch evl1 
bas In its Gonox-ete to:rm. Thus' oausa detl01en~' must not be unde:-
stood as the absenoe of any power. It does not say that the wl11 
il inaotlve In s1n.32 Thax-etore Augustlne calls the ev11 wl11 the 
'./fl01ent' cauae ot the evl1 actlon. The wl11, In so tar as It , 
oommits a s1n, performs a spontaneoua aotl "Spontaneus est autem 
lste detectus, quonlam 81 voluntas In amore superlorls Immutabl11s 
boni atabll1s permaneret, non Inde ad sibl placendum. averteratur. ") 
Thus sln, evl1 wll1, In Its concrete torm Is not pure passlvlty. 
nor non-aotivit" but a spontane6us mov •• ent. Besldes. ma~ 81no-
IlJDls, whloh AugustIne uses for 'detloere' such aa -,e.ereret,'aver-
tetre f, t rell99,wu:" t, • oontemnere t, all have the .eanlng of an ao-
31K.Sclpl0 do •• not se. this mater1al aspeot of ev11, al It 
ls found In Augustine's teadhlng about the 'oausa defl01ena'. 
Scipio wrlte. on p. 1071 "Ole Auat1uoht, dass lUi a.s US.t und das 
so •• kelne a.usa .ttlo1ena su tlnden sel, aondern nu~ elne cau •• 
aetielen., 1st ~ooK nu» .In bl11Iges Wort.plel, VOl' weloham slo~ 
er fiehk.r in den wlchtlgaten Erorterunaen huten 9011te. So .ehl' 
Augustin praktlsoh das Bo.e nw.st und sloh del" furohtbar verderD-
lichen Maoht dess.loen bewusst 1st, so lat doch selne Lebre vom 
Ubel und BOlen - intolge selner antlk-asthatlsohen Nelgungen- eben 
zu s.br blo ••• Theorl. In des Wortea etymologlsch-wlssenschatt-
llener Bedeutung. und as tehlt darln zu sehl' das 8ewusst.eln von 
del' Macht und Bedeutung dessen. was Kant-allerdings von del' anderen 
Selt. her su extrem - 'das radlka1e Bose t senannt hat." 
320t• ~ Llbera Arbltrl0, II, 20, PL. 32, 1270. 
33~ C1vltate ~, XIV, 13J ~. 41, 420. 
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tlve movement of the wl11. They thus conflrm the conviction that 
Augustine means a real aotive movement by his concept of 'oausa 
deficlens'. So one may say that teffioere t and 'defioere t are not 
different in regard to intensity and reality of the will's movemen1 
but they are difterent in regard to t~eir dlreotion seen against 
the background of the universal order. 
For a deeper understanding of the ooncept 'causa deticiens., 
we have to think of what we said earlier about the intimate con-
nection between the free acting of man and the cooperation of God 
that exists in the Augustinian way of thlnking, Man as he has been 
created by God is wholly directed toward God and is called to the 
most intimate oommunion with God. For this communion with God he 
is equipped with a divine vital power, which he uses in his love 
of God. These acts of love man accomplishes himself as they have 
been given to him by God. Thus his aoting is efficient. This is 
the task man has to perform, to lay hold on himself and to fulfill 
himself by and with his free acts. 
In sin, however, man turns .way from God. From the highest 
good he t~ns to the finite goods. This aversion is a defeotus. 
But it is a defect not only in regard to the Object. Man falls 
away trom himsel.f by not aooomplishing any more the high power of 
grace, the love of God. In a certain way man acts with halt of 
his power only. His activity 1s only 'delioiens', insufficient. 
In the same degree as man does not achieve himself and his own per-
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tectlon, he also falls away from God and Hls divine order (~ 
ae'erna), thus committing sin. 
Ooneluding we must say that the origin of moral evil lles ln 
the oreated free will. Turning a'lla'1 from God, ho.ever" the will 
is not effioient, but deficient, lacking goodness, not achieving 
that goodness God gave it the power to achieve. Since thus the 
evil will ls deprived of goodness, lt does not need an efficient 
cause. For the absenc,e of goodness needs no cause. This does not 
mean that in sin the will ls not active. It means that the slnner 
is rejecting the grace. God offers him for doing the good, thus 
falling away fram the intimate unlty with God. 
Did Augustine succ.ed .ith his teaching about the causa ~­
fleiens in making it impossible to declare ultimately God respon-
sible for moral evil? Doe. not the question arise: Why dld God 
glve man freewill? Is not the donor of this dangerous glft him-
self ultimately responsible for our morally bad deeds?3~ To this 
dlfficulty Augustine ans.ers that the '11111, although not an abso-
lu'e good as the vl~es, nevertheless 18 a gOOd35 which 'lias dest 
34D8 Libera Arbitrio, I, 16, PL. 32, 1240: "Sed quaero utrum 
ipsum l!ie~ arbItrlum quo paceanat facultatem habere convincimur 
oportuerit nobis dari ab eo qui nos fecit. Videmur en1m non fuiss 
peccaturi, si iato careremus; et metuendum est ne hoc MUndO Deus 
etiam maletactorum nostro~ auotor existimetur." 
35Ib1d., II. 19. !!!. 32, 1269: "Ita fit ut neque i11a bona 
quae a peccantibus appetuntur, ullo modo mala sint, neque ipsa vo-
luntas libera, quam in bonis quibusdam medi1a numerandam ease 
comper1mus." 
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to be used fo~ the accomplishment of mo~al good. God 1s not re-
sponsible fo~ the misuse of this gift. As the eye is not evil be-
oause 1t oan be m1sused, sO neither tne w1l1 1s ev1l because 1t oa~ 
turn away from God. 36 The misuse does not abollsh the goodness of 
the glft. God o~eated man 'tthat. "het.he~ they wll1ed to sin or not 
to sin, they might be the ornaments of h1s un1ve~se".37 The h1gh 
position God gave to man, demanded that Be equipped him wlth this 
preoious g1ft. Because God gave to man all the help and g~aoes he 
needed to stay 1n union with God and 90 to achleve his own perfec-
tion, Augustine oonolude.1 
"Omnino 19itur non in ... 8nio. neo inven1~1 posse. et 
prorsus non esse cont1rmo, QuamodQatr1buantur pec-oata nostra oreatori nostro Deo. lt.} 
3601'. De L1bero A~bItrlo, II, 18, PL. 32, 1267. 
- -
37 De LIbera ArbItrI0, III, 11, PL. 32, 1287. 
17M. Verw,yen wrItes 1n hls 'book D1e Ph1losoPh1, ~ 111-
'elalter" (BerlIn u. LeIpz1g, 1921 ), on page 37: "Eln Werturtel1 
also: d1e F~elhe1t de~ Wahl z.isohen Gut und Bosem ist, trot a ihres 
mogllohen Mls.orauohe. und d.~ daduroh besrundeten e.igen Hollen-
st~ate, .ertvoller als di. naturnotwendlge R10htung auf das Gute, 
bl1det den i~rationalen Einsohlag in dle rationalen Bemuhungen um 
eine Theo~ie des Bo.en. n Verweyen's misinterpretation at Augustlne'! 
point at vl •• as lrrational is founded on Verw.yents negligenoe of 
Augustine's theooentrio way at thinking. 
38De Libero Arbitrio, III, 16; PL. 32, 1293. 
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CONCLUSION 
Let us look back now at this whole study with the question: 
does St. Augustine in his anti-Maniahean works otfer a solution ot 
the probl •• ot evil, that takes away ~rom evil its t~eaten1ng and 
frightening oharaoter. 
W. have seen how Augustine arrives at the tirst stage ot his 
solution by applioation of metaphysical principles whioh he had 
learned trom Plotinus. These prinoiples enabled Augustine to see 
the essenoe ot evil as non-being, as a privation ot beIng and good-
ness. This Augustine will always keep as the essence of evil. The 
Characteristic of this tirst stage, bowever, is that evil is seen 
aa a ~.ceasary consequence ot tln1te material beings. Even in 
their oGPruptlon these 'material things contribute to the beauty and 
perteotion ot the universal order of which they are a part. Thus 
the natural order ot the whole justifles the corruptlon of the part 
ao that the oorruptlon cannot be called aa evil in the striotest 
sense. 
This solution, oorreot within its own limits, is incomplete 
and theretore not satlstrios to man who lives in a world whioh has 
been polluted. By the s~dy of Holy Scripture Augustine becomes 
more and more aware that the only real evil is sin. Sin is evil 
in the strictest sense, because here a oreature decays, turns away 
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trom the source ot all goodness. Sin is not a necessary consequencE 
of manta being oreated, thus contributing to the beauty ot a uni-
versal order; rather, by tree choice it destroys the unity between 
nature and God. 
Throuah sin the whole original o!der is so destroyed that the 
soul is no longer obedient to God, nor the body to the soul, and 
the whole of subhuman nature becomes opposed to man. In this gene-
ral disorder physical evil is not merely the consequence of crea-
tion out of nothing, .but it gets a ne. meaning: it is punishment 
tor sin. As punishment, physical evil has in a stricter sense the 
character of eVil, because it is treely contracted by the sinner. 
rlut since punishment is a means to restore the universal order of 
justice, it is not an ev11 1n an absolute senS8 like s1n. 
Augustine's whole endeavor 1s to show that the cause of any 
~1nd of ev11 oannot be found 1n God. Physical evil as suoh is the 
necessary consequence of finite natures within a temporal hierar-
ohical order. As a falling away from being, physics.l evil has no 
oause at all. Moral evil on the contrary cannot be explained by 
a h1erarchical order, to the beauty of which it would contribute. 
Like pbJsical eVil, it ia a fal11ng aWBY trom being. In so tar, 
it is similaI' to p~sical evil. But as a breaking out ot the ori-
ginal order, moral ev1l needs an independent and free causality 
and can be understood only on suoh terms. However, il the source 
tor sin would be an etfioient cause, then ultimately God would be 
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responsible for 1t, since the will can be efficient only by using 
God's help. Yet, as a falling away from being, moral ev11 has no 
efficient cauae. The cause is deficient. The will as deficient 
cause d~cides not to use the divine po •• r, with the help of which 
it could accomp11sh its own perf.ctIo~. But this decision is com-
pletely ours, to which nothing fopces us. We aaw that Augustine, 
stressing the negat1ve character ot evil, does not neglect the 
other aspect ot evil, namely evil as a powerful force in this worl 
Thus Augustine prove. a God, who is not responsible for the 
evil 1n this world. God, the SUmmwm Esse, created only the good, 
.;;;.;;;;..;;;;.;;=-
and as tar as there is evil in H1s creation, 1t is deoay trom bei 
which God permits for the benefit of a higher good. Nothing hap" 
pens, that the almighty Goodness of God does not make subservient 
to a good. 
The solution of these books then 1s 1n pointing to the al-
mighty goodness of God. From the conviction of Godts goodness man 
may draw h~a consolation; no one needs to despair, since God is 
goodness itself and the good is the only powerful principle, is 
being. 
But Augustine was too much a religIous thinker to be convince 
that he had completely solved the problem of evil, the problem 
which he calls a difficI1lima quaestio. The problem of evil lead 
him to the mystery of the relation between free will and grace, to 
the mystery of predestination and ultimately to the mystery of 
Holy Trinity_ His searohing mind always sought to penetrate deepe 
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into these mysteries, but at the same time he was willing to bend 
his head before the infinite majesty of God, and to adore Him in 
His sanctity. To know that God is the highest Good was enough for 
him to overcome the despair and anxiety of the human heart in the 
face of all the evils of this world. 
The ultimate solution given to the problem of evil is the 
divine love, whieh was presented to~us in Jesus Christ. To this 
Augustine points especially in his later books, but oan be found 
already in his anti-Maniahean works: 
"Sedquoniam non sicut homo sponte aeoidit, ita .tiam 
sponte potest surgere, porrectam nobis desuper dex-
teram De!, !d est Dominum nostrum Jesum Ohristum fide 
firma teneamus, et e%pectemus carta spe et earitate 
aPdent! desld.ramus."l. 
In. Libe~o Arbltrl0, II, 20; PL. 32, 1270 
- -
APPENDIX 
FREE WILL AND GOD':3 FJRMNUVVLEDGE 
TI'aolng the oI'igin of moral evil. back into the human free wil 
Augustine necessaI'ily had to explain the relation between fre8 will 
and God's foreknowledge. 
For many a thinker of olden and modeI'n times freedom of will 
and foreknowledge aI'e incompatible with one another. l Especially 
in the De Civitate Dei Augustine explains in the discussion with 
- -
Cloero's solution of this problem, that this incompatibility is 
only an apparent one. Augustine PI'OV8S that instead of destroying 
the treedom ot wl11, God·. toreknowledge makes free will possible. 
For, as W8 have seen above, everything whioh exists has its exis-
tence only because it partakes in the being of God and beoause it 
corresponds to a divine idea. How then could the knowledge of God 
lLe Roy Burton, P. 121p "We are inevitably forced to ask, 
what is tZ'eedom? In what does a tree aet oonsist? It by a tree 
act .e mean the reduction of a dual or multIple fUture possibIlity 
to a single aotual result, then 1t seems impossible for even omni-
scienoe to know our future choices. ~~solence cannot perform th 
impossible nor oan omniscienoe know the unknowable. It our tree 
ohoioes are foreknown acoording to Augustine's thought, and it thi 
position rests upon anything more than a desire to avoid religious 
soruples, then we find an inadaquate oonoeption of freedom." 
83 
84 
be an obstacle ror the existence ot tree will, 9ince 1t 1s the 
foundat1on for it: 
"Ita tit ut at Deum non negemus esse praese1um omn1um 
tuturorum, et nos tamen velimus quod volumus. Cum 
enim sit praescius voluntatis nostrae, cu1us est prae-
sclus ipsa erit. Voluntas ergo erit, quia volunta-
tis est praesoius. Nee voluntas esse poterlt, a1 
potestate non er1t. Ergo et potestat1s est praesci-
us. Non ergo per 8ius praesc1entis.m mihl potestas 
adim1tur, quae propter •• mihi certior .derit, quia 
ille Guius praescientl~non fallitur, adfuturum 
mihi esse praesolvit."2 
That means that the tree will as such is included in the intramun-
dane causes, as they are known 1n God's omniscience. Then Augus-
tine shows In the example, that it there would be human foreknow-
ledge with regard to tree acts, it would not cause the tree act.3 
How.ver, auch an example does not explain how there can be real 
foreknowledge, it we have a tree will. 
More satistying is the hint that the incompatibility which 
we see between free will and foreknowledge is conditioned by our 
anthropomorphioal oonoeption of God's knowledge. We are aceustomec 
to conoeive God's knowledge as being in time. But in reality ther~ 
is no past, no present and no future in God. Theretore, Augustine 
s81s, we must oompare God's foreknowledge with our human memory. 
As our memory of past events does not produoe or influenoe these 
past events, so God's foreknowledge sees future events, without 
20e Libera Arbitrio, III, 3; PL. 32, 1275. 
........... r ___ 
3~., III, 4; PL. 32, 1276. 
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influencing them, beoause He .ees them as happeaed, as faots.4 
Without doubt these thoughts are not a oomplete explanation 
about the 'how' of the relation between freewill and God's fore-
knowledge, This' how' will be an ete.r>nal riddle tor man. But 
August1ne at least suooeeds in pointing out that there is no con-
tradiotion between these two, whose existenoe we know with absolute 
oertainty. The inner st:ruoture ot'the relation, however, remains 
a JD.1stery. 
4De Libero Arbltrl0, III, 4. PL. 32, 1276: "Siout enlm tu 
memoriatua non cogls facta esse qUae praeterlerunt; sic Deus prae ... 
solentia sua non ooglt raclenda quae tutura sunt. Et siout tu 
quaedam quae racistl memlnistl, nae taman quae meministi omn1a te-
cisti, ita Deus omnia quorum ipse auotor eat praesoit, neo taman 
omnium quae praescit, ipse auctor est." 
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